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NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
BARBARA A. BLISS, PETER MOLK & FRANK PARTNOY*
ABSTRACT
Shareholder activism has become one of the most important and widely
studied topics in law and finance. To date, popular and academic accounts
have focused on what we call “positive activism,” where activists seek to
profit from positive changes in the share prices of targeted firms. In this
Article, we undertake the first comprehensive study of positive activism’s
mirror image, which we term “negative activism.” Whereas positive
activists focus on increasing share prices, negative activists take short
positions to profit from decreasing share prices.
We develop a descriptive typology of three categories of negative
activism and use a private database of activist activity and other handcollected information to provide empirical evidence about the frequency
and manner with which each category occurs. First, informational negative
activism seeks to uncover and then communicate the truth about companies
whose shares the activists believe are overvalued. We show that the
announcement of this kind of activism is associated with a statistically
significant abnormal decline in share prices. Second, operational negative
*
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activism involves dismantling or disabling sources of value at companies.
We document a range of actual and potential instances of operational
negative activism and associated abnormal share price declines. Third,
unintentionally negative activists are failed positive activists: their
announcements of ownership stakes in companies they target are met with
immediate negative abnormal returns.
Using this typology and the related evidence, we explore the policy and
regulatory implications for each category of negative activism. We show a
range of areas where policy and regulatory goals either conflict with or
seemingly ignore the effects from negative activism. We also offer several
ways that existing regulatory approaches could be improved to account for
negative activism. In general, we advocate less regulation, and even
subsidization, of informational negative activism; tighter regulation of
operational negative activism; and a more nuanced approach to
unintentional negative activism.
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INTRODUCTION
On the morning of December 17, 2019, Muddy Waters, an investment
fund, released a statement that it had bet against shares of NMC Health, a
United Arab Emirates-based healthcare company, based on “serious doubts
about the company’s financial statements, including its asset values, cash
balance, reported profits, and reported debt levels.”1 NMC Health’s share
price fell by more than one-fourth that morning.2
On June 17, 2018, Elon Musk announced that a Tesla employee had
sabotaged the car company’s operations, changing its computer code, and
exporting sensitive data to third parties. Musk wrote: “We need to figure out
if he was acting alone or with others at Tesla and if he was working with
any outside organizations.”3
On April 11, 2017, three roadside bombs exploded while the German
soccer team Borussia Dortmund drove by on its way to a tournament
1.
Yusuf Khan, NMC Health Tumbles up to 27% After Carson Block’s Muddy Waters Says It’s
Short, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2019, 7:15 AM), https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/nmc-h
ealth-crashes-27-after-carson-block-muddy-waters-says-its-short-2019-12-1028768403 [https://perma.
cc/79QQ-Q9DS].
2.
See id.
3.
CNBC obtained a copy of Musk’s email. See Lora Kolodny, Elon Musk Emails Employees
About ‘Extensive and Damaging Sabotage’ by Employee, CNBC (June 18, 2018, 5:56 PM), https://www.
cnbc.com/2018/06/18/elon-musk-email-employee-conducted-extensive-and-damaging-sabotage.html
[https://perma.cc/K8B4-U8ZA].
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quarterfinal match. The bombs sent metal pins through the bus, injuring one
of the players, but miraculously sparing the others. Unlike most sports teams,
Borussia Dortmund had publicly traded shares.4
On July 15, 2016, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced a
settlement in which Herbalife, the nutritional supplement company, agreed
to pay $200 million in consumer relief, hire an external monitor, and
substantially change some of its business practices. 5 FTC officials
previously had been pressured by various parties, including members of
Congress, to find that Herbalife misled investors by failing to disclose that
most of its sales were generated from recruiting new distributors, not from
selling to customers.6
On February 10, 2015, an inter partes review was filed with the U.S.
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, challenging a patent held by Acorda
Therapeutics, Inc., a pharmaceutical company whose shares were traded on
NASDAQ.7 The media reported the news of the filing the same day.8
On May 15, 2014, Jim Chanos, the head of Kynikos Associates, appeared
on CNBC and criticized Keurig Green Mountain and SodaStream, two
manufacturers of single-serve beverages. Chanos expressed skepticism
about efforts by both companies to expand into single-serve cold products.9

4.
For a long-form writeup of this story, see Thomas Rogers, The Get-Rich-Quick Scheme that
Almost Killed a German Soccer Team, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 28, 2018, 11:01 PM), https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2018-10-29/the-get-rich-quick-scheme-that-almost-killed-a-germ
an-soccer-team [https://perma.cc/4P77-E6TL].
5.
Statement of the Federal Trade Commission: FTC v. Herbalife International of America, Inc.,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 15, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2016/07/statement-federal
-trade-commission-ftc-v-herbalife-international-america [https://perma.cc/2QVK-CLK8].
6.
See Matthew Goldstein & Alexandra Stevenson, Herbalife Settlement with F.T.C. Ends
Billionaires’ Battle, N.Y. TIMES (July 15, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/16/business/dealbo
ok/herbalife-ftc-inquiry-settlement-william-ackman.html [https://perma.cc/2WZH-RW5P].
7.
See Petition for Inter Partes Review of U.S. Patent No. 8,663,685 at 1, Coal. for Affordable
Drugs (ADROCA) LLC v. Acorda Therapeutics, Inc., No. IPR2015-00720 (P.T.A.B. Feb. 10, 2015).
8.
See, e.g., Julia La Roche, Kyle Bass’ War Against the US Pharmaceutical Industry Has
Officially Begun, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 10, 2015, 1:48 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/kyle-bassfiles-first-ipr-petition-2015-2 [https://perma.cc/Q9HY-9R8L]. For a study of this strategy, see J.
Gregory Sidak & Jeremy O. Skog, Attack of the Shorting Bass: Does the Inter Partes Review Process
Enable Petitioners to Earn Abnormal Returns?, 63 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 120, 130 & n.43 (2015).
9.
See Bruno J. Navarro, Jim Chanos: Best Shorts in a Bull Market, CNBC: HALFTIME REP.
(May 15, 2014, 2:42 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/05/15/jim-chanos-best-shorts-in-a-bull-market.
html [https://perma.cc/BQ9U-WFSQ].
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Year after year, shareholder activism dominates both media headlines10
and legal scholarship.11 Hundreds of times per year, a hedge fund activist
announces that it has acquired a significant stake in a company and then
demands reform.12 The targeted company’s stock price typically increases
during the time surrounding the announcement, and often a vicious battle
ensues.13 Shareholder activists say they are trying to improve companies
10.
The year 2017 alone had activist campaigns involving many familiar firms, including Xerox,
Procter & Gamble, Nestlé, Whole Foods, and General Motors. See LAZARD, 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR IN
REVIEW (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450414/lazards-review-of-shareholder-activism-q4-20
17pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS2G-QSRL]. This trend continued in 2018. See LAZARD, REVIEW OF
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM – 1Q 2018 (2018), https://www.lazard.com/media/450557/lazard-1q-2018-act
ivism-review.pdf [https://perma.cc/AHF3-PLHR] (highlighting campaigns at Lowe’s and Barclays
Bank, among others). The topic of shareholder activism has even penetrated popular culture, with recent
Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton characterizing its practitioners as “hit-and-run activists whose
goal is to force an immediate payout.” Andrew Ross Sorkin, Hillary Clinton Aim Is to Thwart Quick
Buck on Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/28/business/dealbo
ok/clinton-aim-is-to-thwart-quick-buck-on-wall-st.html [https://perma.cc/M9JT-TH99].
11.
Shareholder activism is a particularly fertile area for recent important and influential legal
scholarship, and arguably has been the most important issue in business law scholarship during the
previous decade. For examples, see Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Dancing with Activists, 135 J. FIN. ECON.
(forthcoming 2020); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1100 (2015) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term
Effects]; Lucian A. Bebchuk, Essay, The Myth that Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39 (2012); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter,
The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653, 653–59 (2010); K.J. Martijn
Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, The Shareholder Value of Empowered Boards, 68 STAN. L. REV. 67 (2016)
(examining whether staggered boards provide value in the face of increased activism and other
shareholder interventions); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863
(2013); Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012); Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The New Vote
Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 811, 823–46 (2006);
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870 (2017); Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Investor Activism: Reshaping the Playing Field? (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Economics
Research Paper No. 08-12, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1130969
[https://perma.cc/S5S5-56K9].
12.
See ACTIVIST INSIGHT & SCHULTE ROTH & ZABEL, THE ACTIVIST INVESTING ANNUAL
REVIEW 2018, at 6 (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.srz.com/images/content/1/5/v2/155375/The-Activist-Inv
esting-Annual-Review-2018-HiRes.pdf [https://perma.cc/XL9K-H3GF] [hereinafter ACTIVIST
INVESTING] (finding the number of activist campaigns grew from 570 in 2013 to 805 in 2017); see also
Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 11, at 1100 (finding hedge fund activism to have
grown from 10 cases in 1994 to 272 in 2007).
13.
See C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The Second Wave of Hedge Fund
Activism: The Importance of Reputation, Clout, and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FIN. 296, 297 (2016) (finding
abnormal stock price increases of over 7% during the period immediately surrounding an activist
intervention public announcement). For a prominent example of the conflicts generated by activist
interventions, see Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders Strongly Reject Dissident Slate, Ending
Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/29/business/29tar
get.html [https://perma.cc/8237-6DZZ]; see generally Strine, supra note 11, at 1934–56 (discussing
potential negative effects of investor activism on retail investors that may justify defensive measures).
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and increase share prices by persuading management to improve operations,
or sell off underperforming units, or reveal new information to the public.
We refer to this well-known kind of shareholder activism as positive
activism, because its goal is to make money through interventions that
positively affect share prices.
Although positive activism has received extensive attention, it is not the
only form of activism. The six examples cited above also involve activists
who are attempting to influence companies. However, in these examples,
the activists are trying to destroy their targets, often in unorthodox or
undesirable ways. We label activism that seeks to make money through
interventions that a decrease company’s stock price as negative activism.
In this Article, we identify and systematically address, for the first time
in the literature, the concept of negative activism, which is in many ways
the mirror image of positive activism. In negative activism, the activist
typically sells short 14 a company’s shares instead of buying them. A
negative activist thereby seeks to profit from, and has incentives to cause, a
decline in share prices—the opposite of a positive activist, who profits when
share prices rise.15
The above six examples illustrate what we mean by negative activism.
Muddy Waters, the firm that disclosed skepticism about NMC Health, is run
by Carson Block, a leading short seller.16 Elon Musk asserted that the Tesla
employee-saboteur might have been involved with short sellers. 17 The
perpetrator of the soccer team bombing was a German citizen who had
Although scholarship on activism typically focuses on activists’ efforts to impact share prices, activists
also on occasion intervene in debt markets. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Hedge Fund
Activism in the Enforcement of Bondholder Rights, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 281 (2009) (studying this
phenomenon).
14.
In a classic short sale, the seller borrows shares of stock that she does not yet own and sells
those shares at current market prices; the short seller later “covers” this short position by purchasing the
share at a future date and then returns the borrowed shares. The short seller therefore profits when share
prices decrease between her sale and subsequent purchase. Short Sales, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N
(Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm [https://perma.cc/M7UL-ZV77].
15.
Our concept of negative activists therefore encompasses a larger group than activists who
profit from short positions. In addition to, or instead of, shorting, activists might hold derivative
instruments that function like shorted shares, which we consider later in the Article. Activists might also
hold certain debt instruments that increase in value when share prices decline, such as when those debt
instruments are drafted so that share price declines trigger default in those debt instruments. See, e.g.,
Shaun J. Mathew & Daniel E. Wolf, Shareholder Activism: Evolving Tactics, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Aug. 23, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/08/23/shareholder-activism-evol
ving-tactics/ [https://perma.cc/RU7X-QXAX] (describing bondholders acquiring shareholder voting
rights to trigger company insolvency). But see Vincent S.J. Buccola et al., The Myth of Creditor Sabotage,
87 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (arguing that this problem is overstated). For convenience, we
focus in the Article on activists who profit from shorting company positions, as that method currently
appears to be the most common form of negative activism. However, our implications apply to the
broader set of negative activists who hold instruments that pay off upon share price declines.
16.
Khan, supra note 1.
17.
CNBC obtained a copy of the email, see Kolodny, supra note 3.
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borrowed money to bet $45,000 against the soccer team’s shares on the day
of the attack, seeking potential profits of up to $600,000.18 The campaign
against Herbalife was orchestrated by Pershing Square Capital Management,
a hedge fund with a $1 billion short position in the company.19 The Acorda
Therapeutics inter partes patent challenge was filed by the Coalition for
Affordable Drugs, a group of hedge funds managed by Kyle Bass, who had
taken a short position in the company.20 Jim Chanos had sold short shares
of Keurig Green Mountain and SodaStream before he disclosed those
positions.21
As we show, negative activism is important and surprisingly common,
with hundreds of examples in recent years. Some instances involve large
public companies, such as Herbalife, that are embroiled in controversy.22
Other examples involve claims of corporate mismanagement or misleading
disclosures, 23 in many ways providing a quasi-regulatory function
traditionally served by shareholder class actions, the SEC, and other
bodies. 24 Some negative activism is by firms that hold long positions in
some companies, but short positions in others. Yet the literature on
shareholder activism currently focuses on positive activism and ignores
negative activism, even though negative activism is a significant portion of
activist activity.25
Moreover, negative activism presents crucial policy challenges. As the
word “activism” implies, negative activists do not sit back and wait
passively for stock prices to decline so that their short positions will gain
value. Instead, many actively attempt to induce a decrease in share prices.
In a market economy that typically prioritizes value creation, rather than

18.
Although the team’s stock price instantly fell by 2% after the bombing was announced, it
quickly recovered. The perpetrator later testified that he had set the bombs to traumatize the players,
disrupt their performance, and tank the stock. See Rogers, supra note 4.
19.
For discussion of Pershing Square’s protracted short position in Herbalife, see Lucinda Shen,
Ackman Calls It Quits on Herbalife as Pershing Square Restructures, FORTUNE (Feb. 28, 2018, 5:35
PM), http://fortune.com/2018/02/28/bill-ackman-valeant-herbalife-short/ [https://perma.cc/JD8U-T2X
X].
20.
Although Acorda Therapeutics’s stock price fell approximately 10% on the day of the
announcement, subsequent similar patent challenges by the same group were not as profitable. See Sidak
& Skog, supra note 8, at 123 n.8.
21.
See Navarro, supra note 9.
22.
Valeant Pharmaceuticals is another prominent example. See Lucinda Shen, Bill Ackman
Finally Apologizes for His ‘Huge Mistake’ with Valeant, FORTUNE (Mar. 29, 2017, 12:15 PM), http://fort
une.com/2017/03/29/valeant-pharmaceuticals-stock-bill-ackman-pershing-square-hedge-fund-letter/ [h
ttps://perma.cc/KDT6-UTN2].
23.
See infra Part II.B.1.
24.
See, e.g., Jessica M. Erickson, Overlitigating Corporate Fraud: An Empirical Examination,
97 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2011) (exploring the interaction between various private and public actors in
enforcing securities fraud prohibitions).
25.
See infra Part I for discussion of the literature on positive activism.
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value destruction, negative activism may strike many as troubling or
manipulative.
In this Article, we have two primary goals. First, we set forth an analytic
framework for assessing different types of negative activism. Like positive
activism, negative activism exhibits a range of characteristics, and it is
important not to paint all of negative activism with a single broad brush. A
saboteur at Tesla or a roadside bomber are different from an anti-corporate
campaigner or a patent challenger or a skeptic about a company’s
profitability. We present a rubric for distinguishing among these, and other,
examples.
Second, and relatedly, we address potential policy responses to negative
activism. We argue that responses should be tailored to the characteristics
of the different types of negative activism. The introductory six examples
of negative activism do not all deserve the same regulatory response. We
show several ways that our analysis of negative activism can be applied to
improve business and financial regulation. In the process, we show how
scholars and policymakers might adopt and apply our framework to
business and financial regulation of various types.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I provides background on
positive activism. We describe the conditions that have led to activist
investing’s rapid rise from a small slice of all investments to a significant
force today.26 We also summarize the law and finance literature on activist
investing, and demonstrate its focus on positive activism.
In Part II, we develop an analytic framework for studying and assessing
negative activism. We split negative activism into three categories. First,
informational negative activism seeks to uncover and then communicate the
truth about companies whose shares the activists believe are overvalued.
Jim Chanos’s short selling of beverage companies fits this category, as does
the campaign against General Electric (GE) and certain aspects of the
campaign against Herbalife. We collect data regarding instances of
informational negative activism from 2009 through 2016 and show that the
public announcement of this kind of activism is associated with a
statistically significant decline in prices surrounding the announcement date.
In other words, negative activism appears to accomplish the activist’s
objectives, at least in the short term.
Second, and in contrast, operational negative activism involves
dismantling or disabling fundamental sources of value at companies.
Operational negative activists do more than simply communicate
information. They actually undertake to change, and even damage, the
26.
See, e.g., ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 12 (discussing several new, larger activist
positions taken in 2018).
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companies they target. The Dortmund soccer team bombing falls into this
category, as would the Tesla saboteur if there were proof of a connection to
short selling. Patent challengers and “hacktivists,” who disrupt company
information technology systems, present more difficult cases, which we
discuss in detail. Our discussion of operational negative activism documents
a range of actual and potential instances of operational negative activism.
Third, and most unusual, unintentional negative activism involves failed
attempts at positive activism. Positive activists take long ownership
positions in companies they target, not short positions, and they seek to
increase share prices, not decrease them. On average, these positions are
associated with a 7% cumulative abnormal positive return surrounding
announcement.27 However, not all positive activist interventions are greeted
with such enthusiasm. In some cases, the market reaction to the
announcement of positive activist interventions is negative, sometimes due
to apparent deep skepticism about the activist’s potential interventions. We
view these instances where the positive activist unintentionally brings about
a negative response as unintentional negative activism. Unintentional
negative activism is a fascinating, yet not previously studied, phenomenon.
We also briefly discuss unintentional positive activism, which is failed
attempts at negative activism: in other words, unintentional positive
activism involves negative activists, who are seeking stock price declines,
whereas unintentional negative activism involves positive activists, who are
seeking stock price increases.
Part III turns to regulation and policy. We summarize the policy goals of
activist regulation and the current regulatory approach, which largely
focuses on positive activism. We consider the gaps that this focus has
generated for regulating negative activism, and we propose ways that
regulatory policy could and should be improved to account for the
increasingly prevalent phenomenon of negative activism.
Our proposals vary depending on the category of negative activism. We
view informational negative activism, in light of existing antifraud laws, as
presenting minimal additional policy concerns; in fact, a case can be made
for subsidizing this form of negative activism. We see operational negative
activism very differently: it is often, but not always, deleterious or
potentially dangerous. We suggest a new regulatory framework aimed
directly at operational negative activism, and we explore the line-drawing
questions of informational versus operational negative activism that such a
system would require. How we think about operational activism depends
both on its objectives and the extent to which it generates informational
benefits. Finally, we suggest that policymakers, including courts, view
27.

Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13, at 297.
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unintentional negative activism more skeptically than they view general
positive activism. Although in many ways the market reaction will provide
all the deterrent that is needed for unintentional negative activism, a
negative market reaction is an important piece of information that could
justify a defensive approach by company management. For example, courts
might take into account a negative market reaction when reviewing antitakeover responses by a targeted company.
We then conclude.
I. POSITIVE ACTIVISM
We begin by briefly describing the practice of positive shareholder
activism as well as the academic research it has generated. This Part sets up
our focus on negative activism, which we turn to in Part II.
Positive activism has been driven by hedge funds, which rely on
exemptions from the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act to
operate as essentially private, pooled investment vehicles for sophisticated
investors.28 As hedge funds have become more powerful and influential—
managing some $3 trillion in assets today—so too has their proclivity for
activism.29 Although there are thousands of hedge funds, with a wide range
of investment approaches, a significant subset of hedge funds has developed
strategies that target underperforming companies and then seek a variety of
operational or financial reforms aimed at increasing shareholder value.
Positive activists often seek to change company management,30 encourage
or discourage a potential merger or acquisition, 31 change executive

28.
See, e.g., Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Gap Filling, Hedge Funds, and Financial
Innovation, in NEW FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS: OPPORTUNITIES AND POLICY
CHALLENGES 101, 114–15 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2007) (noting that although
“[t]here is no generally agreed-upon definition” for hedge funds, they are typically characterized by four
factors: investment pooling; professional investment manager administration of those pools; not being
generally available to the retail public; and operating mostly outside securities regulation and registration
requirements); Linda Chatman Thomsen et al., Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Perspective, 39 RUTGERS
L.J. 541, 544 (2008) (noting that a hedge fund is “generally . . . an entity that holds a pool of securities
and perhaps other assets that does not register its securities offerings . . . and which is not registered as
an investment company” (quoting U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF
HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, at
viii (2003))).
29.
Melissa Karsh, Hedge Fund Assets Pass $3 Trillion in 2016 for First Time: Chart,
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-23/hedge-f
und-assets-pass-3-trillion-in-2016-for-first-time-chart [https://perma.cc/S5BK-YC6H]; see also
Registration Under the Advisors Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,056 (Dec.
10, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 275 & 279) (reporting that hedge funds accounted for 10% to
20% of all U.S. equity trading by volume).
30.
See, e.g., ACTIVIST INVESTING, supra note 12, at 17 (recounting efforts by Trian Partners to
appoint directors at General Electric and Procter & Gamble).
31.
Id. at 10, 12 (highlighting activists’ attempts to block planned mergers).
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compensation practices, 32 reform corporate governance, 33 and reveal
private company-specific information to the public. 34 Each of these
strategies is designed to add value for shareholders and increase share prices.
Law and finance scholars responded eagerly to the emergence of positive
activism. Early studies of hedge funds highlighted the funds’ ability to earn
significant positive returns, even when adjusted for hedge funds’
comparatively high levels of investing risk.35 These early studies, however,
did not focus on positive activism as a strategy unto itself. Then, in 2007,
two law professors published a book chapter describing a hand-collected
dataset of positive activist interventions,36 and during the following years
several more comprehensive studies were published, consistently showing
that announcements of positive activism were associated with statistically
significant increases in targeted firms’ share prices.37 Scholars also began
examining the characteristics of positive activism, including its varied
objectives and strategies.38
For more than a decade, legal scholars and practitioners also have
debated a range of policy issues related to positive activism.39 Proponents
of positive activism argue that it helps reduce the shareholder apathy and
agency cost problems that inflict publicly held firms, pointing to the positive
32.
Id. at 46–47 (summarizing efforts by asset managers to influence executive compensation
practices).
33.
Id. at 8 (noting that 38% of public activist demands of large firms were related to corporate
governance issues).
34.
See, e.g., Shen, supra note 19 (discussing efforts to affect Herbalife’s share price).
35.
See, e.g., Carl Ackermann et al., The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and
Incentives, 54 J. FIN. 833 (1999); Bing Liang, On the Performance of Hedge Funds, FIN. ANALYSTS J.,
July–Aug. 1999, at 72; see generally René M. Stulz, Hedge Funds: Past, Present, and Future, J. ECON.
PERSP., Spring 2007, at 175 (summarizing hedge fund performance literature).
36.
See Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28.
37.
See, e.g., Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International Study, 30
REV. FIN. STUD. 2933 (2017); William W. Bratton, Hedge Funds and Governance Targets, 95 GEO. L.J.
1375, 1418–21 (2007); Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism,
Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008) [hereinafter Brav, Jiang, Partnoy
& Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism]; Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Frank Partnoy & Randall S. Thomas, The
Returns to Hedge Fund Activism, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 2008, at 45 [hereinafter Brav, Jiang,
Partnoy & Thomas, Returns]; Thomas W. Briggs, Corporate Governance and the New Hedge Fund
Activism: An Empirical Analysis, 32 J. CORP. L. 681 (2007); Christopher P. Clifford, Value Creation or
Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 323 (2008); April Klein &
Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64 J.
FIN. 187 (2009).
38.
See Matthew R. Denes et al., Thirty Years of Shareholder Activism: A Survey of Empirical
Research, 44 J. CORP. FIN. 405 (2017); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate
Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 (2007); Dionysia Katelouzou, Myths and
Realities of Hedge Fund Activism: Some Empirical Evidence, 7 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 459 (2013).
39.
See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, US Hedge Fund Activism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON
SHAREHOLDER POWER 99, 104 (Jennifer G. Hill & Randall S. Thomas eds., 2015) (describing the
shareholder activism literature); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact
of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545 (2016) (raising concerns about
positive activism); Strine, supra note 11 (same).
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shareholder returns associated with positive activism. 40 Critics question
whether positive activism generates long-term value or instead sacrifices
these gains for fleeting short-term profits.41 Several leading scholars have
written comprehensive assessments and critiques of various aspects of
positive activism.42
In sum, positive activism has become a central topic in corporate and
securities law, perhaps the central topic. Given the predominance of debate
about positive activism, it is striking how little attention has been paid to its
mirror counterpart, negative activism, which we turn to now.
II. NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
Our treatment of negative activism contrasts sharply with scholarship on
positive activism, for the straightforward reason mentioned above: Negative
activism profits when share prices decline. In contrast, positive activism
involves activists’ efforts to increase the value of target company shares.
Although commentators have disagreed about the impact of positive
shareholder activists, the widespread assumption has been that positive
activists are at least attempting to add value to share prices, hence the
adjective “positive.”43
Instead, the analysis of negative activism necessarily begins with the
proposition that successful negative activism is bad for shareholders of the
targeted firm. Thus, unlike positive activism, which often carries a powerful
and positive normative presumption from increasing stock prices, negative
activism faces an uphill normative battle, the presumption being that it
destroys shareholder value.
As we show in this Part, negative activism is an even more complex and
varied phenomenon than positive activism. The motivations and techniques
of negative activists vary widely. Accordingly, we begin by presenting a
taxonomy of three categories of negative activism, based on whether it is
primarily informational, operational, or unintentional. Then we demonstrate
40.
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 833 (2005); Gilson & Gordon, supra note 11.
41. Martin Lipton, Bite the Apple; Poison the Apple; Paralyze the Company; Wreck the Economy,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (Feb. 26, 2013), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2013/0
2/26/bite-the-apple-poison-the-apple-paralyze-the-companywreck-the-economy/ [https://perma.cc/7YF
N-MTJZ].
42.
See, e.g., Coffee & Palia, supra note 39; Strine, supra note 11; John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Agency Costs of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, and the Public Morality (Eur.
Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 373/2017, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3058319 [http
s://perma.cc/BA99-ZJLX]; John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism:
Evidence and Implications (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 489, 2014) [hereinafter Coffee
& Palia, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism], https://ssrn.com/abstract=2496518 [https://perma.cc/7D
WY-BRH9].
43.
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 11.
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some of the characteristics associated with each of these three categories of
negative activism by considering a range of data, both statistical and
anecdotal. Much of this analysis focuses on the behavior of hedge funds,
which are the primary players in this space. In other work, we develop the
case for how other types of institutional players beyond hedge funds could
engage in negative activism as part of a broader strategy of short selling.44
A. Three Categories of Negative Activism
To capture negative activism’s nuances, we split it into three categories.
First, we characterize as informational negative activism behavior that seeks
to uncover and then communicate the truth about companies whose shares
the activists believe are overvalued. Examples include recent short sellers
at Herbalife, Valeant, and numerous financial institutions, who have
undertaken investigations that they believed established the companies’
public share prices overstated their actual value. Enron is another prominent
example, where negative activists uncovered and disclosed information
about accounting fraud in 2001.45 Informational negative activism can be
backwards-looking, focused on past disclosures by companies and typically
involving allegations of misstatements or omissions, or forward-looking,
focused on future expectations about a company’s prospects.46
Second, operational negative activism seeks to change the operations of
a company, by dismantling or disabling sources of earnings or cash flow.
For example, operational negative activists have taken short positions in a
company and then argued that its patents were invalid, attempting to reduce
that company’s value. Other operational negative activists have attempted
to influence the likelihood of mergers or recapitalizations, again in an
attempt to reduce share prices. Unlike informational negative activism,
operational negative activism typically is focused on the future, rather than
the past, except to the extent past facts are helpful in assisting the activist
campaign to harm the company’s future prospects.
Third, unintentional negative activism involves attempts at positive
activism that instead are associated with a reduction in share value. Studies
of positive shareholder activism have provided overwhelming evidence that
stock prices usually react positively during the period surrounding the
44.
Peter Molk & Frank Partnoy, Institutional Investors as Short Sellers?, 99 B.U. L. REV. 837
(2019).
45.
Cassell Bryan-Low & Suzanne McGee, Enron Short Seller Detected Red Flags in Regulatory
Filings, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 5, 2001, 1:08 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100491600697855064
0 [https://perma.cc/YBV3-V33U].
46.
See, e.g., Carson Block, Founder, Muddy Waters Capital, Presentation at the Absolute Return
Symposium: “Activist” Short Selling 16 (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.hvst.com/attachments/4120 [http
s://perma.cc/4PBZ-XDSL].
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public announcement of activist intervention. 47 However, recent studies
have demonstrated significant variance in the individual stock price
reactions.48 Although the mean announcement returns are positive, some
attempted positive shareholder activism is associated with a negative market
reaction. It is this subset of attempted positive interventions that we label
unintentional negative activism.
Although negative activism has negative connotations and can result in
harm to firms and society, certain forms of negative activism also can
generate substantial benefits. Informational negative activism can be
desirable when it generates and discloses valuable information, thereby
enhancing the informational efficiency of markets and helping to move
stock prices closer to their fundamental value. Even operational negative
activism can be desirable, if it eliminates company value that never should
have been present, such as by unwinding patents that turn out to have been
improvidently granted.
When addressing shareholder activism, social policy should take into
account these potential benefits. We leave the detailed analysis of these
policy questions to Part III. Our present goal in the remainder of this Part is
to contribute to scholarship on shareholder activism by gathering and
analyzing data related to each of the three categories of negative activism.
B. Empirical Evidence of Negative Activism
In this section, we report a range of empirical evidence for each category
of negative activism. We use a combination of data analysis and anecdotal
evidence. The evidence not only establishes that negative activism is
widespread and influential, but also illuminates the important distinctions
among the three categories of negative activism. These distinctions are
helpful when considering optimal regulatory and policy treatments of each
form of negative activism.
1. Informational Negative Activism
There is abundant anecdotal evidence of informational negative activism.
Harry Markopolos’s recent campaign against General Electric provides a
recent controversial example. Immediately following his accusation that the
company was engaged in accounting fraud, GE’s value declined by 11%, its
largest decline in over a decade, eliminating $9 billion in GE’s market

47. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 37; Partnoy & Thomas,
supra note 28.
48.
See Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13.
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capitalization.49 Numerous analysts were skeptical of Markopolos’s claim,
and GE’s share price later recovered.50 Depending on when and how one
analyzed the Markopolos-General Electric example, a wide range of
conclusions might seem reasonable. Such anecdotal evidence is often
unhelpful; anecdotes can be marshalled to support virtually any position.
There has been significantly less comprehensive study of informational
negative activism. Studying negative activism, of any type, presents
challenges that are absent when studying positive activism. Most
importantly, positive activists must publicly disclose their ownership stake
through a Schedule 13D filing within ten days of crossing the 5% ownership
threshold. 51 There are no analogous disclosure rules in place for short
positions, of any size.52 Also, institutions with more than $100 million under
management must publicly disclose their long positions in quarterly Form
13F filings; these requirements do not apply to short positions. 53
Accordingly, the two most important and reliable data sources for studying
positive activism do not exist for the study of negative activism.
In the absence of disclosure mandates, empirical analysis of short selling
must rely on self-reporting. There are strong incentives for selection bias in
self-reported incidents of negative activism, for both obvious and nonobvious reasons. Negative activists have incentives to report their most
persuasive positions in the most favorable light, and their unpersuasive
positions not at all. Disclosures also can be made at any short selling
threshold: someone who is short only a handful of shares with little money
at risk can post a report online and then selectively boast about a subsequent
stock price decrease.
Less obviously, short sellers are generally reluctant to report their
positions publicly. Many fund managers believe that disclosing positions
can lead to “copycat investing,” making them reluctant to give away their
informational advantages. 54 Additionally, evidence from Owen Lamont
49.
Shawn Tully, How the Man Who Nailed Madoff Got GE Wrong, FORTUNE (Oct. 3, 2019,
5:00 AM), https://fortune.com/2019/10/03/ge-accounting-markopolos-madoff/; Thomas Gryta & Mark
Maremont, GE Is New Target of Madoff Whistleblower, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 15, 2019, 6:24 PM), https://w
ww.wsj.com/articles/ge-is-new-target-of-madoff-whistleblower-11565866617 [https://perma.cc/87QBC8JT].
50. Joshua Fineman & Esha Dey, It’s Almost Like the Shocking GE Short Thesis Never Happened,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 25, 2019, 1:31 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-25/it-s-alm
ost-like-the-shock-ge-short-thesis-never-happened [https://perma.cc/K2ZD-96FU].
51.
For additional discussion of disclosure rules for positive activism, see infra notes 132–150
and accompanying text.
52.
For additional discussion of disclosure rules for positive activism, see infra note 158 and
accompanying text.
53.
See infra notes 139–141 and accompanying text for additional discussion.
54.
See, e.g., Annie Massa, NYSE Pleads for Rules to Make Hedge Funds Reveal Short Positions,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 21, 2015, 10:43 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-21/nyse-
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shows firms take legal and regulatory actions against disclosed short sellers
by alleging criminal conduct, suing them, hiring private investigators,
asking public authorities to investigate them, and manipulating securities
markets to impede short selling.55
Notwithstanding these difficulties, there have been some attempts to
analyze informational negative activism. In a 2016 article, Alexander
Ljungqvist and Wenlan Qian reported on a study of 358 short-seller reports
targeting 124 companies from 2006 to 2011.56 They find these reports have
a significant impact on various forms of market activity. Short-seller reports
are associated with more frequent trading and widen the bid-offer spreads
for the targeted stocks, creating order imbalances and increasing volatility
while significantly decreasing share prices.57
In another 2016 article, Lei Chen considered 443 similar types of shortselling reports from 2007 to 2014; these reports identified problems at
several dozen Chinese firms listed on U.S. exchanges.58 This study found
share prices of the targeted firms declined in reaction to these reports, as did
prices at peer firms with the same auditor.59 Chen’s study reinforces the
notion from Ljungqvist and Qian that self-reporting by informational
negative activists can have a significant impact on markets.
In a more comprehensive 2020 working paper, Wuyang Zhao reported
results from a collection of more than 6,000 reports on negative activist
events in Seeking Alpha, an online crowd-sourced investor reporting
platform, as well as in Activist Shorts Research, a newsletter that tracks
incidents of negative activism.60 Zhao confirmed that negative activism was
associated with a statistically significant negative market reaction.61 Zhao
and Yu Ting Forester Wong used the same data sources to confirm that

pleads-for-rules-to-make-hedge-funds-reveal-short-positions (quoting hedge fund manager David
Tawil).
55.
Owen A. Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms, 2 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD.
1 (2012). These costs of disclosure generate a separating equilibrium between a group of aggressive, less
risk averse negative activists, who are willing to expose themselves to the potential risks associated with
a public short position, and more conservative negative activists, who prefer to avoid those costs and
instead reap the benefits of their information over time as it gradually disseminates into the market. This
distinction between aggressive and conservative informational negative activists introduces additional
bias into any study based on voluntary public announcements.
56.
Alexander Ljungqvist & Wenlan Qian, How Constraining Are Limits to Arbitrage?, 29 REV.
FIN. STUD. 1975 (2016).
57.
Id.
58.
Lei Chen, The Informational Role of Short Sellers: The Evidence from Short Sellers’ Reports
on US-Listed Chinese Firms, 43 J. BUS. FIN. & ACCT. 1444 (2016).
59.
Id. at 1476.
60.
Wuyang Zhao, Activist Short-Selling and Corporate Opacity (Jan. 28, 2020), https://papers.s
srn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852041 [https://perma.cc/4ZVU-3UR9].
61.
Id. at 3.
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companies targeted by negative activists suffered decreases in investing,
financing, and payout activities.62
Most recently, Joshua Mitts analyzed a set of almost 3,000 anonymous
negative activist reports in Seeking Alpha and found that reports are
associated with significant, but short-term, decreases in the prices of
targeted stocks. 63 Mitts characterized the results as consistent with
misstatement manipulation, with the authors fabricating negative
information to drive down stock prices.64 Authors also reportedly adopted
new anonymous profiles once their credibility had been exhausted by the
fabricated reports.65
Finally, in a current working paper, Ian Appel, Jordan Bulka, and
Vyacheslav Fos used a sample of 252 publicly disclosed short positions
culled from Factiva’s media coverage from 1996 through 2015 to show
these campaigns result in an average -7% abnormal return to the target.66
The authors provide detailed findings broken down by allegation and
several other factors and conclude that much of the abnormal return is
driven by “active” allegations, rather than allegations about general firm
overvaluation.67
However, even as this interest in negative activism has increased,
previous studies have not seriously examined important issues about the
nature and categories of negative activism. We turn to these issues in the
remainder of this section, beginning with a description of our efforts to
contribute to scholarly understanding in this area.
First, we developed a dataset of informational negative activism based
on Activist Shorts Research reports from 2009 to 2016.68 We collected 825
reports of negative activism and, following the coding methodology of
Activist Shorts Research, we labeled each negative activist intervention as
involving primary allegations of the following categories: accounting fraud;
competitive pressure/industry issues; an upcoming dividend cut; an
ineffective roll-up; major business fraud; questioning medical effectiveness;
62.
Yu Ting Forester Wong & Wuyang Zhao, Post-Apocalyptic: The Real Consequences of
Activist Short-Selling (Mar. 25, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2941015
[https://perma.cc/U4DH-QBSZ].
63.
Joshua Mitts, Short and Distort (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 592, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3198384 [https://perma.cc/6VGQ-F8KM].
64.
Id. at 39–40.
65.
Id. at 29.
66.
Ian Appel & Vyacheslav Fos, Active Short Selling by Hedge Funds (Eur. Corp. Governance
Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 609/2019, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id
=3242516 [https://perma.cc/QC42-RXUB]. The authors find similar results, although of lower
magnitude, when considering cumulative abnormal returns of more traditional shorter windows. Id. at
38 tbl.4.
67.
Id. at 23.
68.
Activist Shorts Research functioned as an aggregator of disclosed short campaigns. It has
since been sold to Activist Insight. See ACTIVIST INSIGHT, https://www.activistinsight.com/.
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misleading accounting; overvaluation; over-levered; ineffective product;
fraudulent stock promotion; upcoming earnings miss; and other allegations
of illegality. While we know the alleging party, we do not know the extent
of the alleging party’s short position.
We found a mean cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 69 for targeted
securities from one day before the negative activist’s public announcement
through one day after the announcement of -6.99%. This finding is robust
to other specifications of event windows: the CAR from three days before
through three days after announcement is -7.20%, and from ten days before
through one day after the return is -5.65%.70
Table 1 dissects the announcement returns by primary allegation type.
Allegations of major business fraud are associated with significant negative
returns (-15.58%), as are allegations related to accounting fraud (-10.41%),
ineffective products (-9.21%), and fraudulent stock promotion (-11.64%).
As mentioned above, informational negative activism can involve either
forward- or backwards-looking information. Table 1 therefore also
categorizes the allegations into forward and backwards looking. The
average CAR associated with backwards-looking allegations is -8.77%,
while the average CAR associated with forward-looking allegations is
-4.15%. 71 The results are sorted by aggregate market cap loss within
backwards- and forward-looking allegations.
Table 1 – Returns to Informational Negative Activism by Primary
Allegation Category
Allegation

N
825

Mean
CAR[1,1]
-6.99%

Mean
CAR[3,3]
-7.20%

Mean
CAR[10,1]
-5.65%

All
All backwards-looking:
Ineffective roll-up
Accounting fraud
Product ineffective
Misleading accounting
Over-levered
Major business fraud
Medical effectiveness
Other illegal
Stock promotion

507
36
63
42
73
37
77
74
52
53

-8.77%
-5.01%
-10.41%
-9.21%
-3.94%
-8.79%
-15.58%
-5.82%
-7.01%
-11.64%

-9.75%
-6.99%
-13.71%
-8.70%
-4.55%
-11.98%
-17.88%
-3.60%
-9.91%
-9.99%

-8.53%
-4.33%
-17.00%
-2.02%
-6.13%
-6.50%
-21.73%
-0.12%
-8.47%
-3.83%

Market Cap.
Loss [-1,1]
(millions)
$ (116.45)
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$
$

(104.53)
(196.73)
(175.38)
(135.12)
(114.36)
(109.25)
(82.63)
(81.56)
(65.74)
(18.57)

69.
CARs are calculated as the abnormal stock return relative to the value-weighted Center for
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) index return surrounding the announcement period.
70.
The median numbers are slightly lower, but comparable.
71.
The difference in CAR between forward- and backwards-looking allegations is statistically
significant at the one percent level.
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All forward-looking:
Competitive pressures
Overvalued
Dividend cut coming
Upcoming earnings miss

318
127
159
10
22

-4.15%
-3.43%
-4.57%
-12.80%
-1.28%

-3.13%
-3.87%
-1.60%
-16.90%
-3.60%

-1.06%
-3.52%
1.87%
-16.14%
-1.19%

$
$
$
$
$

(135.44)
(155.67)
(129.54)
(91.19)
(81.59)

Of course, because activists voluntarily choose to make these reports, our
sample of self-reported activism is expected to be biased towards statistical
significance. It is likely that many short sellers do not disclose their
positions. There are two important points about such undisclosed short
selling. First, to the extent undisclosed informational negative activism
occurs, the aggregate amount of all informational negative activism
obviously is higher than reported in our tables. Second, it is likely that
undisclosed informational negative activism would, if it were disclosed,
result in comparatively lower cumulative abnormal returns than the negative
activism in our sample. Public disclosure brings the increased likelihood of
litigation, regulatory costs, and reputational costs, 72 leading activists to
disclose instances that promise the largest expected stock movements. But
with no disclosure mandate, self-reported activism provides the best source
of study.
To determine activists’ success when braving these costs through public
disclosure, we next examined how shorting success varies by individual
activist. We identified fifty-one separate informational negative activists
with at least three activist events. The list includes a wide range of short
sellers, encompassing dedicated short-only activists and activists that
implement strategies other than shorting. The complete list, along with
associated mean cumulative abnormal returns, is set forth in Table 2.
We sorted the data in Table 2 by average market capitalization loss to
illustrate the relative economic impact of individual informational negative
activists. The results are consistent with examples such as the Muddy
Waters-NMC Health announcement that began this article regarding the
success of informational negative activism, with some activists earning
stunning returns. Many of the negative activists in the first rows of the chart
are those with the most publicized reputations as short sellers. Out of the
fifty-one negative activists, forty-eight have average CARs that are less than
zero, in the negative activist’s desired direction. Overall, the announcement
of negative information activism is associated with negative returns,
although there is significant variation.

72.

See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
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Table 2 – Returns to Individual Informational Negative Activists
Short seller

N

Mean
CAR[-1,1]

Mean
CAR[-3,3]

Greenlight
Capital
Dialectic
Capital
Kynikos
Associates
Prescience
Point
Muddy
Waters
Infitialis
Gotham City
Research
Citron
Research
J Capital
Research
Bronte
Capital
BlueMountain
Capital
Whitney
Tilson
Trinity
Research
Anonymous
Analytics
Greenwich
Research
Spotlight
Research
Friendly Bear
Asensio
Kerrisdale
Capital
Gravity
Research
Suhail Capital
Spruce Point
Capital

12

-9.97%

-15.51%

-20.15%

$(839.92)

9

-1.17%

-0.03%

1.95%

$(451.09)

28

-1.84%

-2.50%

-5.45%

$(388.36)

9

-13.88%

-21.11%

-26.40%

$(356.85)

15

-18.60%

-22.45%

-22.52%

$(299.21)

5
5

-5.97%
-19.30%

-6.20%
-16.08%

-8.99%
-15.64%

$(278.97)
$(261.64)

61

-10.16%

-7.66%

-4.09%

$(258.78)

4

-1.32%

-4.33%

-4.27%

$(253.79)

25

-10.79%

-13.61%

-18.20%

$(217.68)

4

-9.32%

-15.55%

-20.69%

$(217.49)

19

-4.47%

-4.92%

-0.73%

$(203.89)

3

-18.03%

-7.62%

-35.19%

$(172.49)

4

-3.51%

-2.75%

-7.51%

$(149.45)

5

-8.72%

-13.62%

-3.27%

$(142.89)

5

-4.23%

-9.04%

-5.56%

$(137.05)

9
4
26

-9.44%
4.97%
-8.80%

-5.01%
2.04%
-8.11%

-3.17%
1.63%
-11.37%

$(133.79)
$ (96.61)
$ (72.65)

4

-11.36%

-15.10%

-5.93%

$ (71.72)

8
22

-2.97%
-4.79%

-1.44%
-5.11%

-1.28%
-8.58%

$ (70.34)
$ (70.06)
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Mean
CAR[10,1]

Avg.
Market
Cap.
Change Per
Event [-1,1]
(millions)

2020]

Shareholder
Watchdog
Forensic
Factor
Cannell
Capital
Cliffside
Research
Lemelson
Capital
Glaucus
Research
Alfred Little
GeoInvesting
Xuhua Zhou
Alecto
Research
SkyTides
Bleecker
Street
Research
Prescience
Investment
Pump Stopper
Martin
Shkreli
Absaroka
Capital
Real Talk
Investments
Alpha
Exposure
Street
Sweeper
Melissa Davis
Off Wall
Street
Mako
Research
Richard
Pearson
Lakewood
Capital
Aristides
Capital
Copperfield
Research
Marc
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10

-10.44%

-2.68%

-9.35%

$ (62.98)

6

-18.67%

-11.66%

-15.05%

$ (62.41)

5

-3.20%

4.03%

4.74%

$ (60.89)

5

-14.10%

-14.65%

-28.79%

$ (51.85)

3

-1.39%

-0.98%

8.84%

$ (50.04)

11

-7.08%

-8.40%

-16.19%

$ (47.05)

14
46
11
3

-12.43%
-7.07%
-1.28%
-4.03%

-17.00%
-11.02%
-1.73%
-3.32%

-23.58%
-11.96%
1.32%
5.71%

$ (45.92)
$ (42.53)
$ (36.48)
$ (35.99)

4
14

-8.68%
-12.48%

-9.45%
-8.56%

-40.85%
8.67%

$ (35.63)
$ (34.41)

9

-9.75%

-13.33%

-14.06%

$ (31.07)

18
13

-14.90%
-8.67%

-13.05%
-7.76%

-7.18%
-13.92%

$ (30.66)
$ (27.62)

5

-17.21%

-10.24%

-6.01%

$ (26.54)

6

-3.55%

-2.51%

-8.04%

$ (22.82)

17

-5.95%

-8.69%

-12.72%

$ (18.53)

132

-3.99%

-2.60%

6.76%

$ (13.33)

6
3

-6.20%
-0.58%

-5.96%
-0.28%

-11.35%
-1.31%

$ (11.65)
$ (6.86)

6

-2.38%

-6.54%

-2.79%

$ (5.59)

55

-7.11%

-6.73%

0.51%

$ (1.39)

25

-1.81%

-1.67%

-1.70%

$ 1.14

6

-3.10%

3.57%

-2.67%

$ 8.18

14

-5.65%

-8.15%

-7.08%

$ 41.62

6

1.06%

0.00%

-2.12%

$ 42.50
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Matt Berry
Cable Car
Capital

6
5

4.26%
-0.45%

2.87%
-2.74%

11.46%
0.21%
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$ 66.89
$ 130.81

Next, we examine long-run returns of the firms targeted by informational
negative activists to determine if the market reaction is temporary or persists
over the long term. Figure 1 plots the mean and median buy-and-hold
abnormal return (BHAR) from thirty trading days prior to the negative
activist’s campaign to three hundred trading days afterwards. The negative
market reaction at the activist’s announcement is not fleeting. Target firms’
poor performance persists after the initial revelation. These results are
robust to various asset-pricing models. In unreported tests, we conduct
formal long-term return analyses using calendar-time portfolio regressions.
We form a portfolio by holding all target firms for twelve months after the
activists’ announcement, and we estimate a regression of the portfolio’s
excess returns on the Fama-French three-factor model as well as the
momentum factor. The monthly alphas for the three- and four-factor models
range from -1.959% to -1.734% for equal-weighted portfolios and are
statistically significant at the one percent level.
Figure 1 – Informational Negative Activism Long-Run Returns

Informational Negative Activism BHAR
Buy-and-Hold Return

10.00%
5.00%
0.00%
-5.00% t-30
-10.00%
-15.00%
-20.00%
-25.00%
-30.00%
-35.00%

t

t+30 t+60 t+90 t+120 t+150 t+180 t+210 t+240 t+270 t+300

Mean BHAR

Median BHAR

Table 3 shows long-run returns by allegation type for the one-year period
after the announcement. For consistency, we report the allegations in the
same order as in Table 1. For the full sample, the average (median) buyand-hold abnormal return is -22.43% (-29.51%). The magnitude of the
abnormal long-run returns is slightly larger for backwards-looking
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allegations versus forward-looking allegations. Out of the 825 campaigns,
593, or 71.88%, have abnormal long-run returns that are negative.
Table 3 – Buy-And-Hold Abnormal Return by Allegation
Allegation
All

825

One-Year Average
Buy-And-Hold
Abnormal Return
-22.43%

Backwards-looking:
Stock promotion
Product ineffective
Major business fraud
Medical effectiveness
Other illegal
Accounting fraud
Misleading accounting
Ineffective roll-up
Over-levered

507
53
42
77
74
52
63
73
36
37

-24.27%
-46.64%
-44.58%
-34.90%
-20.50%
-17.26%
-15.70%
-13.84%
-13.42%
-10.28%

-36.61%
-56.60%
-43.32%
-47.51%
-38.09%
-28.70%
-33.22%
-16.64%
-15.08%
-33.35%

Forward-looking:
Dividend cut coming
Overvalued
Competitive pressures

318
10
159
127
22

-19.49%
-27.68%
-22.90%
-16.82%
-6.60%

-20.83%
-26.46%
-27.02%
-17.67%
-1.90%

Upcoming earnings miss

N

One-Year Median
Buy-And-Hold
Abnormal Return
-29.51%

As Table 3 shows, the announcement of informational negative activism
is associated with significant and negative cumulative abnormal returns,
which persist during the subsequent one-year holding period. In other words,
informational negative activism occurs in a variety of ways, with different
types of allegations, but is consistently associated with long-run negative
returns.
2. Operational Negative Activism
What we label operational negative activism is distinguished from
informational negative activism in that it tries to change the operational
aspects of a company’s business in some substantive way. Whereas
informational negative activism seeks to inform the markets about the true
valuation of a company, based on the assumption that the current prices
reflect an inflated valuation, operational negative activism seeks to change
the underlying state of the company and, hence, its valuation.

Washington University Open Scholarship

1356

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:1333

It is worth noting up front that the line between informational and
operational negative activism may not be clear in every instance. We
suggest that one way to delineate between the two is to consider whether
the activist does more than merely revealing information to the marketplace.
Thus, publishing a report stating that a patent is invalid would be
informational; filing an action to challenge the patent’s validity would be
operational. The two types of activism can, of course, be linked in
circumstances like these.
We are not aware of any databases that systematically collect instances
of operational negative activism. Accordingly, our examination of
operational negative activism must necessarily be anecdotal. Nevertheless,
it is apparent that, as with informational negative activism, there is a wide
range of behavior that constitutes operational negative activism, and this
behavior yields a wide range of effects.
We are aware of two prominent categories of operational negative
activism for which some data are available. The first involves challenging a
firm’s patents. In 2015, a group of hedge funds managed by Kyle Bass
shorted shares in pharmaceutical companies and then filed more than two
dozen challenges to those companies’ patents using the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office inter partes review process. 73 This review process
enables a party to “request to cancel as unpatentable 1 or more claims of a
patent” based on doctrines of novelty and obviousness.74 Bass’s strategy of
attempting to disable patents held by targeted firms was controversial and
received extensive media attention.75
Bass’s initial challenges coincided with statistically significant declines
in the stock prices of targeted firms.76 The first challenge, on February 10,
2015, was associated with abnormal returns of -11.94%, and subsequent

73.
See Sidak & Skog, supra note 8, at 122.
74.
35 U.S.C. § 311(b) (2018). For more on that patent review process, see Christopher J. Walker
& Melissa F. Wasserman, The New World of Agency Adjudication, 107 CALIF. L. REV. 141 (2019).
75.
See, e.g., Susan Decker, Bass Battled U.S. Drug Patents and Prices but Lost to ‘Cabal,’
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 10, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-04-10/bass-ba
ttled-u-s-drug-patents-and-prices-but-lost-to-cabal [https://perma.cc/6DUQ-3HEL]; Daniel Fisher,
Hard Times for Patent Trolls and Challengers as Courts, Targets Fight Back, FORBES (Mar. 24, 2017,
9:46 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2017/03/24/hard-times-for-patent-trolls-and-chall
engers-as-courts-targets-fight-back/#248963b42e7f [https://perma.cc/GW9Z-AD6T]; Joseph Walker,
Hayman Capital’s Kyle Bass Vows to Continue Drug-Patent Challenges, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 3, 2015,
6:56 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hayman-capitals-kyle-bass-vows-to-continue-drug-patent-chal
lenges-1441320971 [https://perma.cc/8BMM-DLFX]; Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge
Fund Strategy: Dispute the Patent, Short the Stock, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2015, 7:24 PM), https://www.w
sj.com/articles/hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent-1428417408 [ht
tps://perma.cc/G537-474F].
76.
See Sidak & Skog, supra note 8, at 136–38.
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challenges imposed movements of -4.63% and -2.59%. 77 These patent
challenges are an example of operational negative activism: they seek to
profit by disabling a company’s patents and harming that company’s future
profits.
However, in Bass’s case, the ultimate success of the strategy was mixed
at best. Over time, market reactions to his challenges grew less predictable,
perhaps reflecting a market perception that the strategy was unlikely to
impact the targeted companies’ values.78 In all, only 26% of his challenges
were met with favorable rulings from the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
(PTAB).79
A second well-documented category of operational negative activism
involves the practice of coupling a short position with voting shares
associated with long positions, giving rise to what has been described as
“empty voting” or “encumbered shares.”80 For example, Mason Capital took
a long position in Telus voting shares and a countervailing short position in
Telus non-voting shares, and then attempted to deter Telus from undertaking
a desirable recapitalization in which its voting and non-voting shares would
collapse into a single class.81 Another example involved a group of hedge
funds accused of shorting shares in a Henderson Land subsidiary. 82 The
funds acquired significant voting rights while maintaining a net short
position and used their voting right to block the favorable acquisition of the
subsidiary. 83 A final prominent example is the case of activist Perry
Corporation’s failed attempt to push through Mylan Laboratories’ takeover
of King Pharmaceuticals.84 Mylan had proposed an acquisition of King on
terms that were favorable to King, which would have led to an increase in
King’s stock price and a decrease in Mylan’s. Perry held a long interest of
five million shares in King and a short interest of approximately four million
shares in Mylan; both positions would have paid off if the acquisition went
through. In an attempt to force the transaction against mounting Mylan
shareholder resistance, Perry acquired the right to vote 9.89% of Mylan’s
77.
See id. at 136–37 tbl.2. These negative returns quickly dissipated, and many of the later
challenges were associated with positive abnormal returns, perhaps because Bass’s initial challenges
were later denied by the PTAB. Id. at 138–42, 147–48.
78.
Id. at 138–42, 147–48.
79.
Jeffrey Kuo & Afia Naaz, Attack on Pharma Patents: Checking in on the Kyle Bass IPRs,
POLSINELLI ON POST-GRANT (June 2, 2017), https://polsinellionpostgrant.com/blog/2017/6/2/attack-onpharma-patents-checking-in-on-the-kyle-bass-iprs [https://perma.cc/8P9P-BX8Q].
80.
Hu & Black, supra note 11; Shaun Martin & Frank Partnoy, Encumbered Shares, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 775.
81.
Partnoy, supra note 39, at 100, 111.
82.
Hu & Black, supra note 11, at 834–35.
83.
Id.
84.
For coverage of this transaction, see In re Perry Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 60,351,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2907, 96 SEC Docket 1240, 2009 WL 2163550 (July 21, 2009),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2009/34-60351.pdf [https://perma.cc/ELJ4-6J27].
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shares, while still maintaining a net short position in Mylan, and then used
those votes to encourage the transaction.
In addition to these two situations of operational negative activism, there
is some anecdotal evidence regarding other strategies. Two events from the
introduction provide examples: the employee-saboteur at Tesla,85 and the
soccer team bus bomber. 86 There are other examples as well, such as
Andrew Auernheimer, a “hacktivist” known as “weev.” He had been
convicted for revealing a privacy flaw in an AT&T server, but the
conviction was later reversed and vacated. He then announced plans to start
a hedge fund that would profit from taking short positions in companies and
then targeting their technological vulnerabilities.87
In the extreme, operational negative activism can be obviously
detrimental to a company, and is socially deleterious as well. Consider, for
example, the potential effects of terrorist activities on stock prices.88 In the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York, investigations were made into
whether terrorists, or related individuals or entities, took short positions in
shares of American and United Airlines, the two companies whose planes
were involved in the terrorists incidents.89 Note the perhaps obvious point.
Terrorist attacks negatively impact stock prices by doing more than simply
revealing negative information: they actually negatively impact the
operations of the target company, both by destroying corporate assets and
potentially increasing future costs and risks.
More generally, an individual or organization could seek to profit from
actions that damage a company by taking a short position in advance of
those actions. Short sellers can use corporate espionage and industry
warfare to harm the operations of a company. Existing concerns include
cyberattacks and bioterrorism, which have raised fears about targeting a
wide range of vulnerable potential corporate victims, particularly including

85.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
86.
See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
87.
John Biggs, Weev Talks About Life in Prison and His Plans to Open a Hedge Fund, TRO LLC,
TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 15, 2014, 11:00 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2014/04/15/weev-talks-about-life-in-pri
son-and-his-plans-to-open-a-hedge-fund-tro-llc/ [https://perma.cc/6UPY-TGH3]. It does not appear that
TRO LLC, weev’s fund, has yet been successful in raising significant amounts of money.
88.
See, e.g., G. Andrew Karolyi & Rodolfo Martell, Terrorism and the Stock Market, 2 INT’L
REV. APPLIED FIN. ISSUES & ECON. 285 (2010) (assessing the relationship between terrorist activity and
stock performance); G. Andrew Karolyi, An Assessment of Terrorism-Related Investing Strategies, J.
PORTFOLIO MGMT., Summer 2008, at 108, 108 (finding a small but statistically significant return from
terrorist-related investment strategies).
89.
The events of 9/11 clearly impacted many stocks, bonds, and commodities. Studies of the
potential link between the attacks and the increased trading in put options of American and United
Airlines were inconclusive. See, e.g., Neil A. Doherty et al., Insuring September 11th: Market Recovery
and Transparency, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 179, 187 (2003).

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol97/iss5/5

2020]

NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

1359

the transportation and food industries. 90 Or hedge funds might short
companies and then publicly push those companies to engage in costly
socially responsible behavior, so the hedge fund can profit from subsequent
share price declines.91
Employees are another potential example of operational negative
activism, especially when they leave their employment. Numerous
companies report employees engaging in sabotage and other criminal
conduct when they are fired from their jobs.92 Many such activities have the
potential to impact a company’s stock price.
Historically, labor unions have been activists in a range of ways,
involving both social and economic issues; David Webber recently has
described how labor unions do, and might, use their power as shareholders
to pursue various activist goals. 93 But labor unions also could take the
opposite approach and implement an interesting version of operational
negative activism by recognizing one simple fact: labor strikes cause stock
price declines. The reason is that strikes disrupt company operations and the
expectation of those disruptions is reflected in stock prices, often
immediately. For example, shares of General Motors fell 5% between
September 15 and October 25, 2019, the start and end of the recent labor
strike; at one point during the strike they were down over 12%.94
Might labor unions engage in negative operational activism to capture
some of the profits associated with related share price declines? If labor
unions had shorted shares of General Motors before striking, they could
90. See, e.g., Joshua Mitts & Eric Talley, Informed Trading and Cybersecurity Breaches, 9 HARV.
BUS. L. REV. 1 (2019) (studying trading in securities in advance of cybersecurity attacks); Mike Adams,
Chipotle Is a Victim of Corporate Sabotage, NAT. NEWS (Dec. 23, 2015), https://www.naturalnew
s.com/052405_Chipotle_ecoli_outbreak_corporate_sabotage_biotech_bioterrorism.html [https://perm
a.cc/7E8H-STGE] (speculating, without evidence, that biotech industry food terrorists planted e-coli at
Chipotle restaurants in retaliation for its anti-genetically modified foods menu); Vince Bond Jr.,
Automakers Grapple with Rising Tide of Industrial Espionage, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Sept. 30, 2012,
1:00 AM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20120930/OEM01/120929845/automakers-grapple-withrising-tide-of-industrial-espionage [https://perma.cc/7PM5-5AJ2] (describing increases in industrial
espionage at car manufacturers, including Toyota, Ford, and General Motors).
91.
For more on how to incentivize costly corporate social responsibility, see Dorothy S. Lund,
Making Corporate Social Responsibility Pay (USC Ctr. for Law & Soc. Sci., Paper No. CLASS20-3,
2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3511631 [https://perma.cc/4K5F-GWSA].
92.
See, e.g., Anca Bradley, How to Handle the Disgruntled Employee Out to Sabotage Your
Business, ENTREPRENEUR (Oct. 30, 2015), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/250920 [https://perma.
cc/LNW4-Q7WN] (describing examples of employee sabotage including a “digital bomb” designed to
delete all of a company’s programs to cost it millions of dollars in sales, and noting that half of employees
who leave a company take confidential corporate data).
93.
See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST
BEST WEAPON (2018) (describing the recent history of labor union shareholder activism).
94.
Nora Naughton, As GM Workers Approve New Labor Deal, UAW Ends 40-Day Strike, WALL
ST. J. (Oct. 25, 2019, 5:15 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-gm-workers-approve-new-labor-dealuaw-ends-40-day-strike-11572036798?mod=searchresults&page=2&pos=13 [https://perma.cc/FN4EHMX5].
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have made significant gains. Labor unions potentially could use profits from
the share price declines associated with the announcement of strikes to fund
not only the strikes themselves, but potentially other operations or expenses.
Finally, one could foresee that investment funds that have sold their
investment position between a company’s record date and its voting date
would have reason to engage in operational negative activism. Since the
fund no longer has an economic stake in the company, it can vote its shares
without experiencing any of the economic ramifications from the vote.
Engaging in operational negative activism by voting those shares to harm
the company can actually benefit the fund, if competitor funds hold shares
in that company.
In all, operational negative activism encompasses a hodgepodge of
strategies. Some of these strategies might seem unlikely to occur in practice;
others have already occurred, in limited ways.
3. Unintentional Negative Activism
Our third category of negative activism involves attempts at positive
activism that are nevertheless associated with negative announcement
returns. This unintentional negative activism is therefore attempted positive
activism that is regarded negatively in the market. In these situations, a
positive shareholder activist taking a long position in a targeted company’s
shares does not intend (and loses from) a negative market reaction: hence,
our use of the term unintentional.95
Unintentional negative activism is a phenomenon that has not been
addressed in the literature on hedge fund activism. Empirical studies of
positive activism have recognized that there is a range of announcement
returns, but the distribution of those returns has received little attention.96
For example, in a recent study, C.N.V. Krishnan, Frank Partnoy, and
Randall Thomas examined the announcement returns for hedge fund
activists from 2008 through 2014 to determine which hedge fund
characteristics and behavior were associated with positive announcement
returns.97 They found that measures of clout and expertise were associated
with higher returns, whereas frequency of intervention was not.98 They did

95.
Analogously, we might think of the concept of unintentional positive activists: activists
taking short positions whose efforts instead produce increases in share prices. Table 2, supra pp. 20–22,
reveals several of these unintentional positive activists, which we discuss later in this section.
96.
For example, Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 37; Partnoy
& Thomas, supra note 28.
97.
Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13.
98.
Id.
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not, however, examine specifically those interventions in their data that
produced negative announcement returns.99
We obtained data from Krishnan, Partnoy, and Thomas to examine how
positive activist interventions were associated with negative announcement
returns. We found that a significant number of attempted positive
interventions were associated with abnormal negative returns.100 As shown
in Figure 2 and Table 4, roughly one third of interventions had
announcement returns that were negative. For the subgroup of positive
activism campaigns that resulted in an initial negative market reaction, the
average CAR[-10,1] was -7.26%, compared to 11.26% for the subgroup of
campaigns that resulted in an initial positive market reaction.
Figure 2 – Histogram of Positive Activism CAR
Positive Activism Announcement Returns
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Table 4 – Unintentional Negative Activism from 13-D Filings
Returns
CAR[-10,1]
CAR[-1,1]
CAR[-3,3]

N
438
438
438

% Negative
29.22%
26.94%
29.68%

P25
-0.68%
-0.15%
-0.75%

Median
3.95%
2.32%
2.63%

Mean
5.86%
3.62%
3.84%

P75
11.72%
6.35%
7.96%

The incidence of negative returns varied across the population of positive
activist hedge funds. Numerous funds had at least one intervention during
the sample period that was associated with negative returns upon
announcement. Measuring the return from ten days before announcement to

99.
Id.
100. Because the data come from filings required when the activist acquires at least 5% of a voting
share, it is typically assumed that these activists attempt positive changes. Id. An alternative explanation
could be that these activists have significant, undisclosed short interests that outweigh their positive
stake, and are actually operational negative activists.
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one day after, several activists had negative announcement returns for half
or more of their interventions.101
We report the twenty lowest announcement returns in the sample in
Table 5. We are not suggesting any particular reason for the market reaction
in any specific instance. Each example is associated with a unique set of
facts.
Table 5 – Top 20 Worst Announcement Returns of Positive Activists
Date

Name

CAR
[-10,1]

2/23/2011
8/22/2011

LECG CORP
ALLIANCE
HEALTHCARE
HORIZON PHARMA PLC
AMBASSADORS GROUP
INC
CHINA CERAMICS CO
LTD
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES
AM
GOLDEN MINERALS CO

-81.26%
-36.05%

T2 Partners
Discovery Group

-32.61%
-25.25%
-25.12%

Discovery Capital
Lane Five Capital
Management
James Dunning

-25.04%

David Russell

-21.89%
-20.95%
-20.68%
-20.25%

2/22/2013
1/12/2012

VOLCANO CORP
CELSION CORP
NOVATEL WIRELESS
INC
PENNEY (J C) CO
CARBONITE INC
US AUTO PARTS
NETWORK
SILICON GRAPHICS
INTL
BLOUNT INTL INC
LIVEDEAL INC

Trishield Special
Situations
Engaged Capital
Mangrove Partners
Novatel Shareholders
for Change
Perry Corp.
Discovery Group
Maguire Asset
Management
Wasatch Advisors, Inc.

8/16/2013
2/13/2012

JAVELIN MORTGAGE
BRINKS CO

-16.43%
-16.40%

8/13/2012
11/7/2011
9/27/2011
8/18/2011
7/2/2013
11/4/2013
9/26/2011
3/20/2014
8/9/2013
2/7/2014
7/18/2013
12/23/2011

-19.20%
-18.68%
-18.36%
-18.11%
-17.30%
-16.74%

Hedge Fund

P2 Capital
Isaac Capital Group
LLC
Bulldog Investors
GAMCO Investors

101. These funds include Clover Partners, Red Mountain Capital, Greggory Schneider, Meson
Capital Partners, Mill Road Capital, Western Investment, Discovery Capital, and GAMCO Partners.
There are, of course, a range of explanations for the market reactions to each of these interventions.
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SANDRIDGE ENERGY
INC
QUALSTAR CORP

-16.32%
-16.31%

TPG -Axon
Management
Lloyd Miller

These negative returns can be categorized into two groups. One category
includes negative reactions that occur for reasons independent of the
activist’s disclosure and impending activism. These are the situations where
independent negative developments coincide with the activist’s disclosure.
Given the number of activist campaigns, sheer chance dictates that the
positive activist will occasionally be unlucky in this way. Some of the
events in Table 5 fall into this category; since we selected for the most
significant negative returns, this finding is unsurprising. For example, just
after T2 Partners acquired its stake in LECG with a “belief that the [s]hares,
when purchased, were undervalued,”102 LECG announced a credit event and,
within the month, was liquidated.103 While T2’s investment thesis may not
have worked out, it can hardly be said that they caused LECG’s credit event;
T2’s negative return might therefore be better attributed to bad luck, rather
than unintentional negative activism.
The other category of negative returns, and the one that we view as
unintentional negative activism, encompasses instances where the activist’s
disclosure of her stake leads to a share price decline. The market sees the
activist as bad for the company’s future performance. For example, the
activist might have, in the market’s opinion, bad plans for the target’s future
business. Or, in the market’s opinion, the activist activities might impose
costs on the company’s capable management, perhaps by distracting
management by waging a costly proxy contest.
Bill Ackman’s activism at Target provides an example. Although he and
his fund have had several successful investments, his long stake in Target
was not one of them. Fresh off a successful engagement with Wendy’s
restaurant chain, Ackman acquired a 9.6% ownership stake in Target in July
2007. Target’s price increased leading up to Ackman’s public disclosure on
July 16, but upon his actual disclosure, the stock traded sharply lower, down
2% on the announcement date.104 Investors were disappointed that the bulk
of Ackman’s investment took the form of call options, rather than traditional
long stakes, leading to his later being derided as a “short-term
102. T2 Partners Management, LP, Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) (Feb. 23, 2011),
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1192305/000139834411000422/fp0002576_sc13d.htm [http
s://perma.cc/BD5A-BKMA].
103. Joe Weisenthal, Whitney Tilson’s Latest Embarrassment: XPRT Down 80% Just Days After
He Took an Activist Stake, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 28, 2011, 11:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/
whitney-tilson-lecg-2011-2 [https://perma.cc/7DYE-M73T].
104. Lisa Gewirtz-Ward & John E. Morris, Pershing Buys 9.6% Stake in Target, DAILY DEAL,
July 17, 2007, 2007 WLNR 13634714.
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speculator.”105 Others were puzzled at the lack of specificity in Ackman’s
plans for Target: He disclosed only his belief that Target’s common stock
“is undervalued and [his] inten[t] to discuss with management ways in
which this undervaluation can be corrected.”106 The lack of specificity led
investors to speculate fairly widely about Ackman’s future plans. Some
thought he might increase Target’s leverage or spin off its real estate
holdings.107 Others believed he would increase Target’s credit card business,
while still others believed he would instead spin off its credit card
business.108 Finally, several thought Ackman would provide little positive
change. An analyst at HSBC summed up this position by noting, “I don’t
see how you can make this company perform significantly better.”109 By the
end of the month, Target’s share price had dropped well below the levels
leading up to Ackman’s announcement.
During the following two years, Ackman pushed for various reforms at
Target, but his efforts were met with little success from Target’s board.110
Finally, he waged a proxy contest in 2009 to get five of his nominees elected
to Target’s board. None of his nominees were ultimately elected; indeed,
none received more than 20% of the vote.111 The proxy contest cost Ackman
approximately $9 million and Target $11 million, in addition to the
distraction from running their respective businesses. 112 Ackman finally

105. See, e.g., Zachery Kouwe, Shareholders Support Target over Ackman, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (May 28, 2009, 3:02 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/05/28/shareholder-supporttarget-in-blow-to-ackman/ [https://perma.cc/SXH3-599R].
106. Pershing Square Capital Management, LP, Beneficial Ownership Report (Schedule 13D) 8
(July 16, 2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/27419/000090266407002284/sc13d.txt [http
s://perma.cc/MDX7-S9PY].
107. Gewirtz-Ward & Morris, supra note 104.
108. Id.; Parija B. Kavilanz, Hedge Fund Takes Aim at Target, CNNMONEY (July 16, 2007, 12:00
PM), https://money.cnn.com/2007/07/16/news/companies/target_pershing/index.htm [https://perma.cc/
9TEG-XWCN].
109. Kavilanz, supra note 108.
110. Joe Nocera, Investor Exits and Leaves Puzzlement, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2009), https://www.
nytimes.com/2009/05/30/business/30nocera.html [https://perma.cc/JU7S-8CPH].
111. Id.
112. Mike Coronato, 2017 Proxy Fights: High Cost, Low Volume, FACTSET (Nov. 6, 2017), http
s://insight.factset.com/2017-proxy-fights-high-cost-low-volume
[https://perma.cc/ZH48-YWG4]
(estimating overall proxy contest costs at $20 million); Nicole Maestri, Ackman Loses in Target Proxy
Contest, REUTERS (May 28, 2009, 12:17 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-target/ackman-losesin-target-proxy-contest-idUSTRE54R11420090528
[https://perma.cc/H6DS-E699]
(reporting
estimated costs to Target of $11 million); see generally Zachery Kouwe, Target’s Shareholders Strongly
Reject Dissident Slate, Ending Divisive Proxy Battle, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2009), https://www.nytime
s.com/2009/05/29/business/29target.html [https://perma.cc/9CYK-DMDE] (quoting hedge fund activist
advisor as saying, “I guarantee you that every single Target board discussion over the last six months
has been about this proxy fight and not about setting the business strategy of the company”); Nocera,
supra note 110 (characterizing the campaign as “a huge, expensive distraction for a company trying to
struggle through a recession”).
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exited his position in 2011 at a substantial loss.113
GAMCO Investors provides another useful perspective into how
attempted positive activism can instead result in negative returns. Our
rationale for focusing on GAMCO is twofold. First, GAMCO is not a typical
positive shareholder activist. Founded by Mario Gabelli in 1977, GAMCO
was for decades a fundamental value investor, only later forming an activist
fund.114 Unlike most U.S. activists, GAMCO is not located in Manhattan;
instead, its $36 billion is managed from the suburb of Rye, New York.
Moreover, GAMCO holds many of its investments in mutual and closedend funds, not hedge funds, and its average holding period for activist
investments is over nine years.115
Second, GAMCO generally does not engage in activist tactics that have
been found to be associated with the highest announcement returns. 116
GAMCO favors precatory, non-binding proposals, and it avoids mounting
expensive proxy fights, instead relying on advisors or other shareholders to
propose how a company might accommodate GAMCO.117
We selected a random sample window from January 2016 to September
2018 to examine GAMCO’s 13D filings. During this period, GAMCO
regularly filed a new 13D every few weeks, forty-eight in all during the
thirty-three-month window.118
We find that the average [-10,1] CAR for the forty-eight GAMCO 13D
filings was 1.98%, well below the 7% average CAR for positive activists
that has been widely documented in the literature. The returns are highly
variable: of the forty-eight filings, twenty-six had negative CARs (54% of
the announcements). These data are set forth in Table 6 below.

113. Shira Ovide, Bill Ackman Throws in the Towel on Target, WALL ST. J. (May 16, 2011, 5:59
PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2011/05/16/bill-ackman-throws-in-the-towel-on-target/ [https://perma.
cc/UY64-W3NA].
114. See, e.g., Andy Kern, A Private Market Value Primer from Mario Gabelli, SEEKING ALPHA
(Apr. 27, 2007, 4:00 PM), https://seekingalpha.com/article/33657-a-private-market-value-primer-frommario-gabelli [https://perma.cc/A4WV-5BGD]; Activist Gabelli Value Plus Trust Raises £101M at
Launch, WEALTH MANAGER, http://www.gabelli.co.uk/activist-gabelli-value-plus-trust-raises-101m-at
-launch/ [https://perma.cc/R8VY-UBXN].
115. See Sheeraz Raza, Gamco Investors’ First Proxy Access Nomination to the Board of National
Fuel Gas, VALUE WALK (Nov. 11, 2016, 10:13 AM), https://www.valuewalk.com/2016/11/gamco-prox
y-access/ [https://perma.cc/X22Q-JBXP].
116. See Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13 (finding that high announcement returns are
associated with the willingness to engage in proxy fights and litigation, among other variables
demonstrating clout and expertise).
117. See 13D Filings: Gamco Gets Active, BARRON’S (Apr. 24, 2015, 11:50 PM), http://www.barr
ons.com/articles/13d-filings-gamco-gets-active-1429933831 [https://perma.cc/74TW-BD2S]. Indeed,
GAMCO’s general counsel has cited the appeal of reduced-cost activism, saying “you can piggyback on
someone else’s proxy.” Raza, supra note 115.
118. The average lag between filing dates during the sample period was twenty days, with a
minimum time between filing dates of eight days and a maximum of thirty-four days.
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Table 6 – GAMCO Positive Activism
Ticker

Event Date

Filing Date

CAR[-10,1]

CAR[-1,1]

CAR[-3,3]

OCAT

12/31/2015

1/6/2016

2.35%

4.41%

7.56%

GYRO

1/12/2016

1/21/2016

9.33%

-3.87%

0.42%

MLNK

2/8/2016

2/18/2016

-7.58%

4.19%

-14.36%

POWR

3/8/2016

3/17/2016

-3.55%

-2.18%

-1.66%

SNAK

3/30/2016

4/4/2016

-3.57%

-0.96%

-1.03%

AFOP

4/25/2016

5/5/2016

2.26%

0.43%

-0.59%

EPC

5/20/2016

5/25/2016

-0.53%

-0.97%

-0.15%

CST

6/2/2016

6/2/2016

16.71%

15.56%

16.51%

LORL

6/29/2016

7/6/2016

-10.55%

-4.72%

-3.29%

GDL

2/8/2016

7/18/2016

-2.76%

-0.06%

-0.85%

SGI

8/12/2016

8/22/2016

33.27%

-0.08%

0.16%

FLTX

8/31/2016

9/8/2016

2.34%

2.70%

1.90%

GI

10/13/2016

10/20/2016

1.18%

0.51%

-0.15%

HTZ

1/3/2017

1/4/2017

2.75%

7.07%

5.63%

CPPL

12/28/2016

1/4/2017

-1.24%

-1.88%

-1.07%

VASC

1/23/2017

1/31/2017

-0.16%

0.79%

0.12%

CLC

1/26/2017

2/2/2017

-1.28%

-0.84%

0.18%

CLCD

1/27/2017

2/2/2017

-0.98%

-0.66%

0.52%

RLJE

1/27/2017

2/6/2017

15.79%

2.50%

7.34%

AFI

3/7/2017

3/17/2017

-12.38%

3.37%

-0.67%

GSOL

3/17/2017

3/27/2017

-6.18%

-7.12%

-6.53%

INNL

4/11/2017

4/20/2017

15.78%

-3.44%

6.32%

MWA

5/16/2017

5/17/2017

0.18%

0.39%

0.33%

GENC

5/23/2017

6/1/2017

-0.51%

-0.26%

0.05%

NUTR

6/12/2017

6/21/2017

-0.31%

0.63%

-0.10%

LMCA

6/15/2017

6/23/2017

-1.30%

2.34%

7.46%

TISI

7/1/2617

7/28/2017

-41.12%

-1.96%

-45.53%

NVDQ

8/4/2017

8/16/2017

0.91%

1.25%

0.31%

GUID

8/30/2017

9/7/2017

-0.69%

-0.31%

-0.95%

SMIT

10/11/2017

10/20/2017

5.99%

5.07%

18.19%

EXA

10/20/2017

10/25/2017

-0.28%

0.35%

-0.29%
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11/9/2017

11/13/2017

0.20%

0.49%

0.03%

MGCD

12/9/2017

12/19/2017

-1.57%

-0.60%

-0.74%

RDI

12/22/2017

12/26/2017

-2.36%

-1.34%

4.34%

TMST

12/28/2017

1/2/2018

19.21%

9.79%

7.06%

CCC

12/29/2017

1/8/2018

-2.77%

-0.40%

-2.33%

KTEC

1/25/2018

2/1/2018

46.88%

1.89%

5.98%

ONDK

2/5/2018

2/15/2018

21.90%

8.18%

22.16%

RLJE

2/26/2018

2/28/2018

14.73%

5.40%

15.52%

SPA

3/5/2018

3/9/2018

-25.29%

2.29%

2.52%

GEF

3/16/2018

3/20/2018

12.14%

5.57%

2.52%

FLL

3/23/2018

3/28/2018

5.01%

2.59%

-6.14%

GDL

3/26/2018

3/29/2018

3.16%

0.55%

-1.36%

NPO

6/6/2018

6/12/2018

-0.95%

1.44%

1.28%

INFU

8/14/2018

8/24/2018

-7.31%

-4.26%

-1.78%

JMBA

8/30/2018

9/7/2018

-0.27%

0.37%

0.78%

GCP

9/19/2018

9/20/2018

0.29%

1.76%

3.81%

XRM

9/14/2018

9/24/2018

-1.71%

0.61%

0.53%

1.98%

1.18%

1.04%

Average

The point of singling out GAMCO is not criticism. The data illustrate the
significant variation in market reactions to announcements of attempted
positive activism. It was not apparent from our analysis of GAMCO’s
announcements that there is an easily discernible pattern to predict which
announced interventions will be associated with negative market reactions.
Market reactions vary widely for different interventions, and for different
activists, and sometimes occur for reasons entirely independent of the
activist’s announcement.
In sum, although positive activism is associated with positive returns on
average, that conclusion does not always hold. Many interventions, and
many funds, are associated with negative announcement returns. It is these
interventions that we label as unintentional negative activism.
Finally, we briefly assess the mirror of unintentional negative activism:
unintentional positive activism. Of the examples of informational negative
activism in our database, approximately one quarter were associated with
positive CARs. In other words, the market reaction to the short seller’s
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announcement was positive, leading to losses for the short seller. The data
are summarized in Figure 3 and Table 7.119
Figure 3 – Histogram of Negative Activism [-1,1] and [-10,1] CARs
Negative Activism Announcement Returns
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Table 7 – Unintentional Positive Activism
Returns
CAR[-10,1]
CAR[-1,1]
CAR[-3,3]

N
825
825
825

%Positive
38.66%
27.52%
29.09%

P25
-19.15%
-11.53%
-14.12%

Median
-4.97%
-4.36%
-5.15%

Mean
-5.63%
-6.98%
-7.20%

P75
7.29%
0.46%
0.94%

As with unintentional negative activism, we find that the incidence of
unintentional positive activism varies across the sample of negative activists.
Out of the 825 observations, 319 campaigns were associated with a positive
market reaction, with a mean (median) CAR[-10,1] of 18.06% (11.05%).
Numerous funds have at least one event during the sample period that was
associated with positive returns upon announcement, with several having
positive announcement returns for half or more of their short allegations.120
Since disclosure of short positions is voluntary and costly, finding so many
failed yet disclosed investments is striking.
III. REGULATING NEGATIVE ACTIVISM
As the prior Part reveals, negative activism not only comprises a
significant portion of activism as a whole, but also can be grouped into three

119. The fact that the percentage of failed short activism matches the percentage of failed positive
activism may suggest minimal bias from the short dataset’s reliance on self-reporting.
120. As measured by [-10,1] CARs, these funds include Dialectic Capital, Lemelson Capital, Matt
Berry, Bleeker Street Research, Cannell Capital, Street Sweeper, Asensio, GeoInvesting, Gravity
Research Group, and Mako Research. There are, of course, a range of explanations for the market
reactions to each of these announcements.
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distinct categories. Before turning to the policy implications from this
analysis, we review the current state of activism regulation.
Financial markets are governed by several significant regulatory regimes.
Although hedge funds and other activist investors commonly use
exemptions to escape many of them, 121 this is not to say that activist
investing is an entirely unregulated space. In addition to certain provisions
that directly affect either positive or negative activism, activism of any sort
is governed by general securities antifraud statutes. The Exchange Act’s
section 10(b) general antifraud provision attaches to deceptive conduct in
connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 122 With no direct
disclosure mechanism, 123 section 10(b) is instead primarily aimed at
deterring undesirable behavior.
Section 10(b) encompasses securities manipulation (deceptive conduct
that controls or artificially affects the market for a security),124 securities
fraud (deceptive or false statements, often made by company management,
that affect a security’s price), 125 and insider trading (trading based on
nonpublic information when facing a duty to disclose that information).126
Activism can potentially fall within any of these three groups. For example,
activists with an investment stake might want to engage in market
manipulation by spreading false rumors to raise that security’s price, and

121. For example, the Securities Act’s registration requirements for the offer and sale of securities
exempts private offerings to accredited investors; consequently, activist investment funds avoid
registration and disclosure requirements by having exclusively accredited investors. Securities Act of
1933 § 4(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2) (2018); Rule 506, 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2018) (Rule 506’s
accredited investor safe harbor for meeting section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act). The Securities
Exchange Act requires registration of broker-dealers as well as issuers of more than $10 million of
securities to more than 2,000 shareholders of record; hedge funds and individual activist investors,
however, are traditionally not treated as broker-dealers, and they limit their holders of record to fewer
than 2,000 shareholders of record. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(g), 15(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l(g),
78o(b) (2018); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS: STAFF
REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 18 (2003) [hereinafter U.S.
SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS], https://www.sec.gov/files/implications-growth-hedge-funds-0
9292003.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2M6-MCHV] (distinguishing between “dealers,” which are required to
register, and “traders,” which are not).
122. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2018). In addition to section
10(b)’s antifraud prohibition, section 9 applies to fraud in market manipulation, and section 18 applies
to fraud in documents with the SEC. Exchange Act §§ 9, 18, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i, 78r (2018). Causes of
action within these two sections are generally subsumed within section 10(b).
123. Although section 10(b) does not require disclosure, it may indirectly lead to disclosure as a
means of defeating its deceptive conduct element. See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,
655 (1997) (“[I]f the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic information,
there is no ‘deceptive device’ and thus no § 10(b) violation . . . .”).
124. See, e.g., ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007)
(analyzing securities manipulation claim).
125. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
126. See, e.g., O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
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then sell the stake before the false information is corrected. 127 Another
activist might acquire seats on the board of a company and want to use that
position to make deceptive statements about that company’s operations,
engaging in securities fraud to prop up the stock price and the activist’s
investment returns. Or finally, an activist might acquire private inside
information about a company and want to use that information to trade
profitably in that company’s shares.128 Consequences from violating section
10(b) antifraud prohibitions range from a variety of monetary damages
measures129 to criminal imprisonment.130
Beyond these general antifraud prohibitions, we review below the
regulatory framework that specifically applies to positive activism and
negative activism.131
A. Current Regulation of Positive Activism
Even though much of positive activism may occur through entities
designed to avoid most federal regulation, positive activism is still subject
to important regulatory provisions. Several of these are aimed at disclosure.
Section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires any entity,
including positive activist funds and individual investors, to disclose any
127. See, e.g., Jim Cramer’s Guide to Market Manipulation, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Mar. 20,
2007, 9:22 AM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/03/20/cramer-market-manipulator/ [https://perma.
cc/3EHE-MBZH] (describing this practice in the hedge fund industry); Mitts, supra note 63 (analyzing
anonymous shorters’ manipulation of securities prices).
128. See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v. Rajaratnam,
719 F.3d 139 (2d Cir. 2013).
129. Insider trading cases commonly result in disgorgement damages, while other section 10(b)
violations result in financial damages loosely tied to the impact that the violation had on the securities
market. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(e) (2018) (private securities litigation reform act damage measure
for private section 10(b) causes of action); SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2014) (disgorgement
in civil insider trading context); United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2012) (disgorgement
in criminal insider trading context).
130. See, e.g., Rajaratnam, 719 F.3d 139.
131. We consider here only federal regulation. Although states have adopted “blue sky” laws that
regulate the offer and sale of securities, and also often regulate investment advisors, federal preemption
and other exemption typically renders this regulation inapplicable to hedge funds. See, e.g., U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMM’N, IMPLICATIONS, supra note 121, at 31 (“Because of federal preemption and the
availability of exemptions from adviser registration, only some states exercise regulatory authority over
some hedge fund advisers, and most do not regulate the offer and sale of interests in hedge funds.”). In
addition, depending on activists’ operations, they may find themselves potentially subject to other bodies
of federal law that we do not consider here, such as ERISA or the Commodities Exchange Act. See
SCOTT J. LEDERMAN, HEDGE FUND REGULATION §§ 4:5, 6:13, 7:2 (2006 & Supp. 2009) (considering
regulations related to these areas). Finally, external legal constraints are not the sole means of shaping
activist investor behavior. Hedge funds in particular adopt a variety of organizational constraints to align
investors’ incentives with management’s. See, e.g., LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE
UNCORPORATION 228–31 (2010) (describing the organizational tools used by hedge funds and similar
entities to achieve this alignment); Peter Molk, How Do LLC Owners Contract Around Default Statutory
Protections?, 42 J. CORP. L. 503 (2017) (analyzing how private companies use these organizational tools
to align management and investor incentives).
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beneficial ownership interests that exceed 5% of any class of public voting
shares.132 These disclosures must be made within ten days of acquiring the
5% position and are publicly available for inspection. 133 It also requires
disclosing the purpose in accumulating a 5% stake, to help regulate the
market for corporate control of public companies.134 Although section 13(d)
is not aimed directly at activists, it applies any time activists accumulate a
sufficiently sizable long position in voting shares, often a precondition of
engaging in activism.
Section 13(d) applies to 5% long holdings of publicly traded voting
equity shares, equity options,135 shares of closed-end investment funds, and
certain convertible debt securities.136 It therefore covers a wide swath of
positive activism. Because positive activists seek to increase share prices,137
they adopt long share positions and equity options, since these are the
positions that pay off from increased prices.
Nevertheless, many other instances of positive activism fall outside
section 13(d)’s disclosure requirement. In particular, holdings under 5% of
voting shares, holdings of non-public companies, holdings of non-voting
shares, and holdings of certain financial derivative instruments all fall
outside section 13(d)’s disclosure obligation, yet all can be used to
accomplish positive activism.138

132. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018). Section 13(g) contains
a similar disclosure provision for hedge fund advisors. Exchange Act § 13(g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(g).
133. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); see, e.g., Fast Answers: Schedule 13D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answerssched13htm.html [https://perma.cc/6JKH-TNKW].
134. Rule 13d–1, 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(a) (2018); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1,
22–25 (1977) (discussing the history of section 13(d)’s attempt to impose disclosure requirements on
cash tender offers for control); Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial
Innovation and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 240, 260 (2009) (noting that the section is
designed “[t]o regulate the market for control of public companies”).
135. More precisely, “call” options that are exercisable within sixty days count towards section
13(d)’s 5% number. “Put” options that provide the right to sell securities, but not acquire them, do not
count towards the threshold. Neither do call options that cannot be exercised within sixty days. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13d-3(d)(1)(i).
136. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1); Rule 13(d)-1(i), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-1(i) (removing non-voting
securities from section 13(d)’s purview).
137. See supra Part I; Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 28 (noting how funds might purchase options,
rather than shares, to profit from price changes).
138. Although it is difficult to gauge the extent of this undisclosed activism, because by definition
it is undisclosed, both anecdotal and systematic empirical evidence suggest it is appreciable in scope.
See, e.g., Stephan Jank et al., Flying Under the Radar: The Effects of Short-Sale Disclosure Rules on
Investor Behavior and Stock Prices, 135 J. FIN. ECON. (forthcoming 2020), http://www.fmaconference
s.org/Norway/Papers/Transparency_short-sales_FMA_subm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N6LG-TNMV]
(finding investors cluster below investment disclosure thresholds); Jim Rossman, Review of Shareholder
Activism – 1H 2017, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.
edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Lazards-Review-of-Shareholder-Activism-1H-2017.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/T389-EQ5C] (finding three cases of activist campaigns led by activists holding 4.9% of outstanding
shares in the first half of 2017).
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Section 13(d) is not the sole disclosure provision. Section 13(f) of the
Exchange Act fills in some of the remaining gaps. Passed to enhance public
disclosure of institutional investor holdings, the section requires investment
managers of more than $100 million to file quarterly reports of their
holdings within forty-five days of the quarter’s close.139 Not all holdings fall
within section 13(f)’s disclosure requirement; the disclosure requirement
includes the same securities as section 13(d), without the 5% requirement.140
Again, this means that many long positions constituting positive activism
will be disclosed, but activism built on holdings of non-public companies,
holdings of non-voting shares, or holdings of certain financial derivatives
need not be reported pursuant to section 13(f). And, of course, section 13(f)
requirements do not apply to individual investors, or to investment
managers with under $100 million in assets under management.141
In addition to disclosure required by sections 13(d) and 13(f) of the
Exchange Act, investment managers of all types, including hedge funds,
must register as investment managers with the SEC under the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940 and make additional periodic required disclosures.142
These disclosures occur through Forms ADV and PF. Form ADV requires
investment managers to disclose basic information about management
strategy, organizational and operational characteristics of the managed
funds, the size of assets under management, the services that the advisor
provides, and whether managed funds use certain types of service
providers.143 Much of this information is then made available to the public,
although certain sensitive advisor-specific information is disclosed only to

139. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f); Rule 13f-1, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.13f-1 (forty-five-day filing window); see generally Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1063
(discussing the scope of section 13(f)’s application). In addition, the SEC has raised concerns about
compliance with section 13(f)’s reporting requirement. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REP. NO. 480,
REVIEW OF THE SEC’S SECTION 13(F) REPORTING REQUIREMENTS, at vi (Sept. 27, 2010),
https://www.sec.gov/files/480.pdf [https://perma.cc/PH24-HZ8E] (finding that no SEC division audits
section 13(f) filings; the SEC does not systematically use the data disclosed in section 13(f) filings; and
that section 13(f) filings often contain significant errors or omissions).
140. 15 U.S.C. § 78m; 17 C.F.R. § 240.13f-1(c) (defining 13(f) securities and cross-referencing
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)).
141. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f).
142. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2018). The Act was amended in
2010 to remove the “private adviser” exemption that hedge funds had traditionally used to avoid
registration. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 403,
124 Stat. 1376, 1571 (2010) (eliminating the exemption); Kahan & Rock, supra note 38, at 1050 n.152
(noting that hedge funds were “typically exempt from registration” under the private adviser exemption).
A limited exemption was enacted for investment advisors with under $150 million in assets under
management. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 203(m), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m); Dodd-Frank § 408,
124 Stat. at 1575.
143. See, e.g., Wulf A. Kaal, The Post Dodd-Frank Act Evolution of the Private Fund Industry:
Comparative Evidence from 2012 and 2015, 71 BUS. LAW. 1151, 1160 (2016).
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the SEC. 144 Detailed information about fund holdings need not be filed
pursuant to Form ADV.
Form PF, on the other hand, requires hedge funds and other private
investment funds with at least $150 million in assets under management to
submit non-public annual reports about these funds and their trading
strategies.145 Although the SEC provides summary reports based on Form
PF data, the underlying data are not themselves publicly available.146 Form
PF requires managers to disclose the aggregate value of long positions
across different asset types, although the individual holdings need not be
identified.147
Most recently, the Dodd-Frank Act added swap market reporting
requirements via Regulation SBSR. Activists may use derivative
instruments to gain disproportionate voting clout relative to their
shareholdings.148 As a result of Regulation SBSR, the SEC requires that
certain information about security-based swaps be reported, including
contractual information about the swaps being traded, the date, time,
quantity, and price of trades, counterparty identities, information about the
clearing process, and more.149 Most of this information is reported only to
the SEC; only limited information about trading prices and the transaction,
without identifying information about traders, is subject to public disclosure
requirements.150
B. Current Regulation of Negative Activism
Negative activism is, in principle, subject to both the same regulations
that apply to positive activism as well as certain rules that specifically
govern negative activism through their regulation of short selling. Among
these short-specific rules, Regulation SHO 151 prohibits “naked” short
144. Investment Adviser Public Disclosure, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, https://www.adviserinf
o.sec.gov [https://perma.cc/6SSK-UH35] (providing a searchable database of publicly available portions
of filed Forms ADV).
145. Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Manager Registration Under the Dodd-Frank Act, 50 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 243, 269–73 (2013) (discussing the Form PF reporting requirements).
146. Partnoy, supra note 39, at 104.
147. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF 12–15, 17–20, https://www.sec.gov/files/formpf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/24KC-362Y].
148. See, e.g., CSX Corp. v. Children’s Inv. Fund, 654 F.3d 276, 288 (2d Cir. 2011) (Winter, J.,
concurring) (“The district court’s legal analysis concluded that the one role of such swaps was to avoid
the disclosure requirements of Section 13(d)—no doubt true . . . .”); Hu & Black, supra note 11, at 823–
46 (discussing strategic use of derivative financial instruments to avoid various regulations).
149. Regulation SBSR, 17 C.F.R. § 242.901(b) (2018); see generally Security-Based Swaps:
Recently Adopted and Proposed Rules Under Title VII, SULLIVAN & CROMWELL 5–16 (Sept. 10, 2015),
https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications/SC_Publication_Security_Based_Swaps_09_10_201
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AXB-SEFW] (summarizing reporting obligations for security-based swaps).
150. SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, supra note 149, at 9–10.
151. Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.200–242.204 (2018).
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selling, in which the short seller sells securities that she does not own or has
not arranged to borrow. 152 Broker-dealers are also prohibited from
executing customers’ short sales if a short selling client has failed to deliver
shares within three days of the sale.153 Problems from naked short selling
can occur when the short seller is unable to deliver the shorted shares,
leaving the purchaser unable to vote the shares she thought she purchased
and leaving the short seller subject to large financial exposure.154 Others
have raised concerns about naked short selling’s potential to manipulate
securities downward.155 Because of the concerns, Regulation SHO prohibits
the practice.
In addition, section 16 of the Exchange Act prohibits statutory insiders
from selling shares of their company stock short. 156 Statutory insiders
include key company executives as well as any holder of a 10% long
position, conceivably limiting some forms of negative activism.157
Other rules govern the margins that short sellers must satisfy when
selling shares short. Short sales are executed on margin—the seller
effectively borrows shares that she does not yet own—making them subject
to margin regulations. These regulations require the short seller to post 125%
to 150% of the short position’s value as collateral, with the short seller
required to make up any shortfalls that emerge over time.158 Many brokers

152. See Short Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 48,709, 68 Fed. Reg. 62,972, 62,975–78 (Nov.
6, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 242). Regulation SHO is buttressed by special antifraud
liability for those who misrepresent to broker-dealers that they can deliver shorted shares. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-21; cf. “Naked” Short Selling Antifraud Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 58,774, 73 Fed.
Reg. 61,666, 61,675 (Oct. 17, 2008) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240) (noting that Rule 10b-21
imposes no additional liability beyond that already contained within section 10 and Rule 10b-5).
153. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 60,388, 74 Fed. Reg. 38,266,
38,269 (July 31, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200, 242) (enacting Rule 204).
154. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 11, at 1690. The worry is that without a predetermined ability to
cover short positions, the shorter may have to pay an extraordinarily high price ultimately to buy them.
This financial exposure concern, of course, could be addressed by margin or other requirements that do
not disproportionately restrict certain types of behavior like naked shorting.
155. See generally id. Some argue that naked short selling also brings market benefits, such as
higher liquidity and greater pricing efficiency of the shorted securities. Veljko Fotak et al., Fails-toDeliver, Short Selling, and Market Quality, 114 J. FIN. ECON. 493, 504 (2014).
156. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2018). The provision also is
known for its limits on short-swing profits by requiring disgorgement of profits gained (or losses avoided)
by purchases followed by sales (or sales followed by purchases) within any six-month period. 15 U.S.C.
§ 78p(a)(2)(C).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1).
158. Regulation T requires short sellers to post collateral equal to 150% of the initial market value
of the shorted shares. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2018). Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority (FINRA), an organization governing the behavior of most brokers and dealers, requires shorts
to be funded by at least 125% of the shorted amount on an ongoing basis, after the trade has already
been executed. 4210. Margin Requirements, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/fi
nra-rules/4210 [https://perma.cc/2Q3S-RRM8]; see also Order Approving FINRA Rule 4210, Exchange
Act Release No. 62,482, 75 Fed. Reg. 41,562 (July 16, 2010).
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and dealers used by short sellers set their own margin requirements in excess
of these minimums.159
Short sales are also subject to an “alternative uptick rule.” Through
2007,160 the SEC employed the original “uptick rule,” which imposed no
restrictions on short selling when prices were rising but which prohibited
short sales when prices were falling.161 The original uptick rule was replaced
by the alternative uptick rule in early 2010, which imposes restrictions on
shorting securities only when prices have declined by at least 10% relative
to the prior day’s closing price. 162 Prohibiting short sales during falling
markets is meant to slow down price declines and remove incentives to
manipulate prices downward.163
Occasionally, short sales are banned in their entirety. During the
dramatic stock market fall in September 2008, for example, short selling
was banned in financial firms’ securities.164
Forms ADV and PF also require investment managers to disclose certain
information about their activities to the SEC, irrespective of whether those
activities involve long or short positions. Regulation SBSR, which requires
disclosure to the SEC (and limited public disclosure) of information related
to security-based swap transactions, also applies to derivative instruments
that give negative activists, or others, a net short position.165
Notably, however, other disclosure obligations for positive activism—
principally sections 13(d), 13(f), and 13(g)—are triggered only by long
holdings of securities. 166 In other words, negative activists can adopt
negative positions of any amount, far in excess of sections 13(d) and 13(g)’s
5% long threshold, without giving rise to disclosure requirements. In other
159. See, e.g., Margin: Borrowing Money to Pay for Stocks, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr.
17, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsmarginhtm.html [https://
perma.cc/N8QC-T9SH] (stating that “many brokerage firms have higher maintenance requirements”
than FINRA’s minimum threshold); 9 Frequently Asked Questions About Short Selling, CHARLES
SCHWAB (Aug. 30, 2019), https://www.schwab.com/active-trader/insights/content/9-frequently-askedquestions-about-short-selling [https://perma.cc/V2EV-9Q4T] (imposing maintenance margin
requirements ranging from 130% to 200%).
160. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 59,748, 74 Fed. Reg. 18,042,
18,042 (Apr. 20, 2009) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242). The uptick rule had been enacted seventy
years before, in 1938. Id. at 18,044.
161. See generally Jonathan R. Macey et al., Restrictions on Short Sales: An Analysis of the Uptick
Rule and Its Role in View of the October 1987 Stock Market Crash, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 799, 803–04
(1989) (summarizing the uptick rule).
162. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232,
11,244 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242).
163. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 11, at 1690.
164. Id. at 1694. The last time short selling experienced blanket bans in the United States was in
1931. Id.
165. Regulation SBSR, 17 C.F.R. § 242.901(b) (2018); see also supra notes 148–150 and
accompanying text (discussing Regulation SBSR reporting requirements).
166. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), (f), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g) (2018).
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parts of the world, such as the European Union, funds are required to
disclose short positions of 0.5% or more of a firm’s share value,167 but no
analogue is present in U.S. securities markets.
C. Rationalizing Negative Versus Positive Activism Regulation
As the prior discussion shows, positive and negative activism are
regulated rather differently. Positive activism regulation relies principally
upon disclosure rules, while negative activism instead adopts rules to
govern the manner in which short sales occur. The two approaches share the
similar trait of invariance based on the type of positive or negative activism,
however.
Here, we analyze whether these regulatory techniques make sense from
a policy perspective. Since positive and negative activism involve taking
long and short positions, respectively, the optimal regulatory techniques for
each could reasonably differ. Moreover, since the type of activism can also
vary within each of positive and negative activism, optimal regulation could
differ even further. We therefore discuss optimal approaches across
operational, informational, and unintentional negative activism—the
framework developed in Part II—as comparisons to current policy.
At first blush, negative activism might appear to present straightforward
and simple questions. If social welfare is enhanced by maximizing
shareholder value, then surely activities that reduce shareholder value, and
negative activism, are socially deleterious. Indeed, short selling is often
criticized as involving controversial, generally undesirable trading
practices.168 But a closer examination reveals that negative activists can play
an important, and indeed helpful, role in financial markets. These costs and
benefits vary based on the category of negative activism.
Before we turn to how public policy might address this variation, we
pause briefly to consider the costs borne by short sellers as a result of the
current regulatory regime. These costs are important and considerable, and
typically do not apply to positive activism.
First, the risk-return profile of a short position differs significantly from
that of a long position. By selling short, the investor profits only when the
stock price decreases. Thus, the maximum profit from a short position per
167. Regulation (EU) 236/2012, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 March 2012
on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, art. 6, 2012 O.J. (L 86) 1, 11; see also
Short Selling, EUR. SEC. & MKTS. AUTHORITY 2, https://www.esma.europa.eu/regulation/trading/shortselling [https://perma.cc/AV9Q-QJMY].
168. See, e.g., Joanna Lee, Recent Development, Activist Short Sellers: Market Manipulators or
Market Protectors?, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 274, 276–78 (2013); Feng Ye, Note, Trading on the
Outcomes of Patent Challenges: Short-Selling Petitioners and Possible Modifications to the Inter Partes
Review Process, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 557, 567–69 (2016).
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shorted share is the price of the stock (stock price falling to zero), whereas
the potential loss is infinite (stock price rising indefinitely). Moreover, the
asset pricing literature suggests that long positions in equity earn a risk
premium over time.169 The short seller, therefore, starts from behind and
must overcome the expected market rate of return before expecting a profit
on the shorted shares.170 In other words, absent some advantage associated
with a particular short position, short selling is a risky proposition that
expects to lose money. Positive activists can ride the winds of the market;
negative activists must fight against them.
Second, short selling’s margin requirements tie up the short seller’s
assets as collateral.171 These assets could otherwise be put to other uses. The
opportunity cost of posting collateral, especially if that collateral is cash,
adds to the difficulty and expense of short selling as a strategy.
Third, while short positions are open, short sellers must reimburse the
stock lender for any dividends or distributions paid to the shareholder of the
shorted stock, representing a real cost to the short seller. 172 Moreover,
depending on the requirements of particular brokers, short sellers can be
required to pay an additional “special” premium for shares that are difficult
to borrow.

169. For example, one recent survey suggests that the equity risk premiums are in the range of 4%,
meaning that the return on a diversified index of stocks was expected to outperform risk-free yields by
approximately 4%. See John R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Equity Risk Premium in 2018 (Apr.
2, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3151162 [https://perma.cc/EBF9-UFB2]
(reporting an average equity risk premium of 4.42%). The average short position, then, is expected to
cost the short seller the equity premium plus the risk-free rate, or approximately the market rate of return,
over time. See, e.g., Bill Barker, How Have Stocks Fared the Past 50 Years? You’ll Be Surprised.,
MOTLEY FOOL (Apr. 22, 2016, 9:07 AM), https://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/04/22/how-hav
e-stocks-fared-the-last-50-years-youll-be-s.aspx [https://perma.cc/2PTY-NNML]; see generally PK,
S&P 500 Return Calculator, with Dividend Reinvestment, DON’T QUIT YOUR DAY JOB (Dec. 31, 2019),
https://dqydj.com/sp-500-return-calculator/ [https://perma.cc/F6VG-C4RD] (allowing for calculation of
average annualized S&P 500 returns over various periods of time, and showing historical nominal stock
market returns of approximately 9%).
170. However, by shorting shares, the short seller typically gains some funds that she could invest
in a market basket of securities to earn the market rate of return, although this offset will be limited by
the degree and type of collateral (such as cash) that the activist uses to satisfy margin requirements as
well as any particular margin agreement terms, both initially and over time.
171. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.12(a) (2018); see also supra notes 158–159 and accompanying
text.
172. See, e.g., Dan Caplinger, Dividends Paid on Short Sales, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 15, 2015, 6:00
PM), https://www.fool.com/taxes/2015/01/15/dividends-paid-on-short-sales.aspx [https://perma.cc/MA
P4-CR5S]. This situation can lead to short squeezes from creative uses of dividends, as when Overstock
announced a special dividend of “Digital Voting Series A-1 Preferred Stock” that would trade only on
Overstock’s proprietary platform. Matt Levine, Overstock Has Had a Wild Week, BLOOMBERG (Sept.
19, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-19/overstock-has-had-a-w
ild-week [https://perma.cc/8WR4-473S].
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Fourth, short sellers are required to repay the stock loan on demand,
exposing them to the risk of a short squeeze.173 If a short seller is unable to
find an alternative lender, then the short seller must purchase the shares on
the open market to repay the loan, effectively closing the position
prematurely at whatever current market prices happen to be.
Fifth, public short sellers risk invoking the ire of regulators and private
companies when engaging in short selling. As mentioned earlier, public
disclosures of short interests have brought allegations of criminal conduct,
investigations by public and private parties, and the threat of legal action.174
Taking long positions and attempting to raise stock prices typically, absent
fraud, does not invoke these responses, particularly from the target of those
long positions, again making shorting disproportionately costly.
Finally, the tax treatment of gains from short selling is less favorable
than gains on long positions. Long positions that are held for more than one
year are eligible for favorable long-term capital gain tax rates, which are
less than ordinary income tax rates.175 The tax treatment for call options,
which can be used for positive activism,176 follows a similar rule, where the
holding period is measured from the date that the option is exercised.177 In
comparison, any profits from short positions are taxed at higher short-term
ordinary income rates, regardless of the period for which the activist
maintained the short position.178

173. See, e.g., Key Points About Regulation SHO, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Apr. 8, 2015), htt
ps://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/regsho.htm [https://perma.cc/4MT4-LBU2].
174. Appel & Fos, supra note 66; Lamont, supra note 55; Stefan Nagel, Short Sales, Institutional
Investors and the Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 78 J. FIN. ECON. 277, 281–82 (2005) (noting the
indirect constraints to institutional short selling).
175. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2018) (tax rates); 26 U.S.C. § 1222(3) (2018) (defining long-term capital
gain).
176. See, e.g., supra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing Bill Ackman’s use of call
options in his attempted positive activism at Target).
177. Dep’t of the Treasury, I.R.S. Pub. 550, Investment Income and Expenses (Including Capital
Gains and Losses) 58 (Mar. 28, 2019) [hereinafter I.R.S. Pub. 550], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55
0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NY3H-JAQY] (“Any gain or loss on the sale of the underlying stock is long term
or short term depending on your holding period for the underlying stock.”). Selling the call option before
exercising it is taxed based on the length of time for which the call option was held. See, e.g., Robert A.
Green, Assessing the Tax Treatment of Options Trading, FORBES (May 29, 2015, 3:50 PM), https://www.
forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/05/29/assessing-the-tax-treatment-of-options-trading/ [https://
perma.cc/3WEB-Q5BA].
178. I.R.S. Pub. 550, supra note 177, at 55 (“As a general rule, you determine whether you have
short-term or long-term capital gain or loss on a short sale by the amount of time you actually hold the
property eventually delivered to the lender to close the short sale.”). Thus, the negative activist could
achieve long-term capital gains on a short position only if she held the underlying asset for at least twelve
months before the short position closed (a “covered” short). Activists who short securities without
holding the underlying shares, or who have held the underlying shares for fewer than twelve months
before the short closes, will have gains taxed at short-term capital gains rates.
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In sum, short sellers face significant costs and barriers.179 In our view,
the assessment of these costs and barriers when short sellers are engaging
in negative activism depends on the type of negative activism. We now turn
to a policy analysis that assesses negative activism in light of these
comparative costs. We generally see informational negative activism as
normatively desirable, presenting little need for additional regulation;
operational negative activism as normatively undesirable, in need of
additional regulation; and unintentional negative activism as normatively
neutral with no need for additional regulation.
1. Informational Negative Activism
Informational activism seeks to profit from share price movements after
the activist releases new information into the marketplace. Typically we
associate this behavior with activists’ promulgating good information about
a company; informational negative activism, however, decreases stock
prices by revealing bad information about a company.
We begin our analysis with the widely-accepted view among finance
researchers that revealing negative truthful information is socially valuable
and that the skewed incentive structure naturally encourages the discovery
and release of positive information, but discourages the discovery and
release of negative information. We then analyze the regulatory approach to
informational negative activism and suggest reforms.
Regardless of whether the information is positive or negative in nature,
scholars typically view new accurate information about securities as a good
thing.180 When more information is available in the marketplace, securities
prices are better indicators of fundamental company values, and price
discovery is enhanced. 181 Accurate securities prices are instrumental in
making sure that limited funds are put towards their most valued uses. Firms
whose shares are inaccurately overvalued attract too much capital relative
to their economic contributions; firms whose shares are inaccurately
179. To some extent, it is possible to use derivatives, including swaps and options, to avoid some
of these costs, although derivatives also pose unique challenges of their own.
180. See generally Merritt B. Fox & Kevin S. Haeberle, Evaluating Stock-Trading Practices and
Their Regulation, 42 J. CORP. L. 887, 897–903 (2017) (reviewing the economic benefits from accurate
securities prices); Peter Molk, Protecting LLC Owners While Preserving LLC Flexibility, 51 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 2129, 2172 (2018) (using the mispricing of investment interests as an argument in favor of
changing LLC governance law).
181. See, e.g., Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 573 U.S. 258, 269–77 (2014)
(reaffirming courts’ presumption of the efficient capital markets hypothesis when securities markets
meet certain requirements); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 246 n.24 (1988) (assuming that
“market professionals generally consider most publicly announced material statements about companies,
thereby affecting stock market prices”); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory
and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 415 (1970) (describing the semi-strong efficient capital markets
hypothesis, which presumes that securities prices reflect all publicly available information).
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undervalued attract too little.182 To ensure capital is efficiently deployed,
securities prices should reflect the fundamental value of their respective
enterprises, which relies on information entering the securities markets.
Importantly, both positive and negative information must enter the
securities markets for prices to be accurate. If only positive information
were reflected in prices, the worry is that securities would be systematically
overpriced. Investors might add a market-wide “unrevealed negative
information” discount, but then some securities would be more overpriced
than others, depending on their underlying firms’ relative ratios of
unrevealed negative information to public positive information. This
mispricing leads to misallocation of capital, which securities market
regulators actively seek to avoid.183
Therefore, informational negative activism is desirable simply to the
extent it introduces new information about securities into securities markets.
But even the threat of discovering and disclosing negative information can
be valuable. The disciplining hypothesis set forth by Massa, Zhang, and
Zhang states that as short sellers increase price information and attack the
misconduct of firms, their presence, by increasing the probability and speed
with which the market uncovers earnings management, reduces managers’
incentives to manipulate earnings. 184 Consistent with the disciplining
hypothesis, Fang, Huang, and Karpoff find evidence that short selling, or its
prospect, reduces firms’ manipulation of earnings numbers, helps detect
fraud, and improves asset pricing efficiency. 185 The mere potential for
uncovering and disclosing negative information can therefore align manager
and shareholder interests.
Uncovering and disclosing negative information is therefore valuable,
but the need is even greater once we consider companies’ disparate
incentives for voluntary disclosure of positive but not negative information.
Positive news boosts share prices. Increasing one’s share price not only
makes raising future capital easier,186 but also makes management of those
companies look like they are successful at their stewardship. A higher share
price also means that any management performance-based compensation is

182. See, e.g., Fox & Haeberle, supra note 180, at 895–904.
183. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2018) (directing the SEC to assess whether “action[s] will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation”); 15 U.S.C. § 78c(f) (2018) (same).
184. See Massimo Massa, Bohui Zhang & Hong Zhang, The Invisible Hand of Short Selling: Does
Short Selling Discipline Earnings Management?, 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 1701 (2015).
185. See generally Vivian W. Fang, Allen H. Huang & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Short Selling and
Earnings Management: A Controlled Experiment, 71 J. FIN. 1251 (2016).
186. Higher share prices in secondary markets mean the company can raise relatively more funds
from later selling new securities into those secondary markets.
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higher, 187 making these individuals financially better off by releasing
positive news.
On the other hand, companies have little financial incentive to release
negative information voluntarily. In fact, companies have reason to devote
efforts to prevent or obfuscate this information from the public. To the
extent negative information reduces share prices, the same forces that act to
encourage management to release positive information encourage them to
keep the negative information under wraps.188 Of course, companies’ ability
to hide negative information is limited in some respects. Periodic disclosure
rules require public companies to release information that falls within
enumerated categories, whether that information is positive, negative, or
neutral.189 Antifraud rules also prohibit companies from releasing false or
misleading information when those companies choose to communicate
voluntarily.190 But the resulting downward pressure on share prices from
releasing negative information means that management has little reason to
go beyond required disclosures.
If having negative information (or the threat of discovering negative
information) in the marketplace is valuable, 191 yet companies lack the
187. Alex Edmans et al., Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence 152 fig.6
(CESifo, Working Paper No. 6585, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302
3787 [https://perma.cc/5M2V-AHAA] (showing widespread use of performance-based pay among
company management). Even when management’s compensation is not directly tied to firm performance,
management may voluntarily hold shares in their managed firms, giving them the same incentive to
increase share prices.
188. See S. P. Kothari et al., Do Managers Withhold Bad News?, 47 J. ACCT. RES. 241 (2009);
Roni Michaely et al., Further Evidence on the Strategic Timing of Earnings News: Joint Analysis of
Weekdays and Times of Day, 62 J. ACCT. & ECON. 24 (2016).
189. Filing requirements can be found in Section 13 of the Exchange Act, which applies to
companies that are listed on national securities exchanges, large companies with a large number of
shareholders, and companies that have made a public offering of their securities under the Securities Act
of 1933. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2018) (periodic filing
requirements); Exchange Act § 12(a), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a), (g) (listed on a national securities exchange,
or large); Exchange Act § 15(d)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78o(d)(1) (public offering). Even if negative information
falls within a required disclosure category, the negative repercussions from disclosing this information
suggest the company will delay disclosing this information until required. Positive information, on the
other hand, might be expected to be disclosed fairly quickly, because of its positive effect on stock prices.
See, e.g., Kristoffel R. Grechenig, Positive and Negative Information – Insider Trading Rethought 10
(Univ. of St. Gallen Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2007-28, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pap
ers.cf m?abstract_id=1019425 [https://perma.cc/XRB7-6DCQ].
190. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (general antifraud provision);
Exchange Act Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (banning fraudulent statements or omissions of
information that would be required to render statements not misleading); Securities Act of 1933 § 11,
15 U.S.C. § 77j (providing private cause of action for fraud in a registration statement); Securities Act
of 1933 § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (civil liability for fraud in a prospectus).
191. Cf. Mitts & Talley, supra note 90 (asserting that disclosing cybersecurity vulnerabilities can
be undesirable, to the extent that it causes others to tap into these vulnerabilities and expose sensitive
information). As a more general matter, we might be concerned to the extent that revealing negative
information gives rise to negative operational changes by another. One would hope, of course, that the
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incentive to release this information unless required, then another way for
this information to become available is through private efforts to discover
and release it. Insider trading restrictions keep company insiders from
disclosing this information for personal gain, 192 and the SEC’s private
whistleblower program has been met with only modest success so far,193 so
another route must be found for this information to enter the marketplace
via private means. Enter informational negative activism. Activists typically
face no insider trading restrictions to prevent them from profiting by
revealing negative information about a company. As long as the activist is
not a statutory insider (an executive of the company or a holder of at least
10% of the company’s shares)194 and as long as the activist does not inherit
fiduciary duties of trust and confidence from the information’s source
(which is unlikely to happen in many circumstances),195 the activist is free

increased prospect of negative disclosures would encourage firms to prevent against these vulnerabilities
and quickly manage them when exposed. These preventative steps, however, impose costs of their own,
although they may also bring collateral benefits, to the extent they deter additional undesirable behavior.
For example, the firm that locks sensitive documents in the safe to deter information breaches also deters
garden-variety burglars. Cf. id. (discussing the costs of prevention); Darius Lakdawalla & Eric Talley,
Optimal Liability for Terrorism (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12578, 2006),
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12578 [https://perma.cc/TFZ6-Y46S] (discussing the costs of prevention).
192. Liberalizing insider trading restrictions for negative information would be one method of
encouraging dissemination of negative information. See, e.g., Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading
in Congress: The Need for Regulation, 9 J. BUS. & SEC. L. 199, 231–32 (2009) (applying this argument
to insider trading by Congressional representatives); Grechenig, supra note 189, at 9–10; Peter Molk,
Uncorporate Insider Trading, 104 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (applying this argument to
unincorporated entities); see generally HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET
59–62 (1966) (describing how insider purchases can transfer information to public markets).
193. See, e.g., Mengqi Sun, SEC Whistleblower Program Has Record-Breaking Year, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 16, 2018, 7:11 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-whistleblower-program-has-record-brea
king-year-1542413518 [https://perma.cc/XQT2-2D4Y] (noting that the SEC paid out a record amount
of whistleblower rewards in fiscal year 2018, although awards were paid to only thirteen individuals,
comprising fewer than ten targets).
194. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2018).
195. For the activist to inherit a prohibition against trading based on material nonpublic
information, the information’s original source must possess such a duty, that source must pass the
information for personal gain, and the activist must be aware that the original source is passing the
information for gain. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983). When information reaches the activist
through a remote tipping chain, the probability that the activist will be aware of anything regarding the
information’s original source grows small, eliminating liability for insider trading. See, e.g., Salman v.
United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 n.1 (2016) (declining to rule on this issue); United States v. Newman,
773 F.3d 438, 453–54 (2d Cir. 2014). Moreover, if the original source does not breach a fiduciary duty
in passing the information, the activist faces no trading restrictions. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665 (requiring
the breach of a fiduciary duty for traders to be liable). Finally, if the activist learns of the information
independently, the activist faces no insider trading restrictions, which generally do not attach to
“outsiders” who acquire and trade on material nonpublic information. See John Reed Stark, Guest Post,
Think the SEC EDGAR Data Breach Involved Insider Trading? Think Again., D&O DIARY (Oct. 2,
2017), https://www.dandodiary.com/2017/10/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-think-sec-edgar-data-br
each-involved-insider-trading-think/ [https://perma.cc/BZ9C-UBLY] (describing SEC attempts to
recognize a new “outsider trading” theory).
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to profit from selling short a company stock and then revealing the negative
information.196
As we noted at the start of this section, short sellers face substantial
additional difficulties and costs unique to taking a short position; these
difficulties and costs deter informational negative activism. 197 Profiting
from price decreases is systematically more difficult and riskier than
profiting from price increases, given stock markets’ expected increases over
time, and short sellers must shoulder the other financial and regulatory
burdens unique to short selling. These disproportionate costs make the
returns from investing in negative information discovery comparatively low,
discouraging investment in its discovery and dissemination.
For all these reasons, the policy argument in favor of encouraging
informational negative activism is a strong one. Informational negative
activism is not only valuable, but also arguably more valuable than
informational positive activism. The reason is straightforward: firms that
seek to maximize their share prices have a disincentive to disclose negative
information, thus skewing the pool of information. Thus, private incentives
alone will encourage the production of positive information more than
negative information. To the extent policymakers want to encourage the
dissemination of information associated with informational negative
activism, regulation arguably should not impose excessive costs that would
deter this kind of activism; indeed, they might even consider subsidizing it.
How does current regulatory policy address these challenges? In many
cases, fairly well.
First, informational activism of all types is in some ways lightly
regulated, which makes informational activism a comparatively attractive
form of activism. One potentially significant regulatory barrier, insider
trading restrictions, is easily overcome as long as the trader makes sure she
has not inherited disclosure duties from the information’s original source.
Most of the other substantive regulation focuses on disclosure obligations.
Although disclosure makes it more difficult for traders to acquire shares
privately over an extended time period, this should be unproblematic for
informational activists, who seek to profit from a relatively quick movement
in price following revelation of their information; indeed, the time between
entry and exit from a position might be entirely accomplished before the
disclosure window comes due. By contrast, the operational activist, who
might devote considerable effort to achieving operational reform (and price
196. Indeed, the SEC recognizes the value that comes from private shorting of stocks. Press
Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Approves Short Selling Restrictions (Feb. 24, 2010), https://w
ww.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-26.htm [https://perma.cc/3YGL-6NKR] (“Short selling can serve
useful market purposes, including providing market liquidity and pricing efficiency.”).
197. See supra notes 169–178 and accompanying text.
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movements) over an extended period, suffers a far greater burden from
being required to disclose her holdings and intentions early in the process.
In addition to imposing a comparatively light regulatory burden on
informational activism, some activist regulation also appears to favor
informational negative activism over informational positive activism. Given
the greater need for private disclosure of negative information, 198 this
balance seems appropriate. The disclosure obligation is fairly manageable
for positive informational activism, but it is nonexistent for most
informational negative activism. 199 Lowering the regulatory burden to
informational negative activism, even if only modestly,200 not only reduces
its costs, but also makes it easier for the activist to amass a greater position
that increases her eventual payoff. Even though activism policy may not
have been set up with this implicit comparative subsidy for negative
activism in mind, its existence is nevertheless an attractive feature of the
current regime.201
On the other hand, other regulatory aspects—the alternative uptick rule,
Regulation SHO, and tax policy—disadvantage informational negative
activism relative to positive activism. Some of these relative costs are only
slight, and so are perhaps not overly troubling. For instance, negativeactivism-specific restrictions from the alternative uptick rule and Regulation
SHO likely will not apply to informational negative activism. Informational
activism does not typically follow dramatic stock declines, making the
alternative uptick rule non-binding202 and making it comparatively easy to
line up covered shorts to comply with Regulation SHO.203 In addition, tax
rules penalize short positions and negative activism relative to long
positions and positive activism, but only when the long position is held for

198. See discussion accompanying supra notes 183–196 and accompanying text.
199. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), (f), (g), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (f), (g) (2018);
see also supra note 166 and accompanying text.
200. Given the short duration of most informational activists’ holdings, the disclosure regimes
may provide little burden for either positive or informational negative activism, since the disclosure
obligation might not be triggered until the activist has already exited her position. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78m(d)(1) (2018); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text (noting that disclosure is required
within ten days after acquiring a 5% voting share stake).
201. Notably, this analysis supports continuing the asymmetric disclosure regimes that require
13D and 13F disclosures for long positions, but not short positions. Although some have pushed for
mandatory public disclosure of short positions, a system tilted in favor of informational negative
activism over positive activism may strike the appropriate balance, given the comparative value of
disclosing new negative information over positive information. See, e.g., Hu & Black, supra note 11, at
875–86; Massa, supra note 54 (arguing for disclosure).
202. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232,
11,244 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); see also supra note 162 and accompanying
text.
203. Regulation SHO, 17 C.F.R. §§ 242.200–242.204 (2018); see also supra note 152 and
accompanying text.
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a year or longer.204 Given informational activism’s short holding periods for
both positive and negative information, it is likely that the tax treatment will
be the same short-term capital gains rate for both positive and negative
activism.205
Finally, some regulations unquestionably disadvantage informational
negative activism. Firms’ ability to employ leverage to short shares is
limited by government regulation, 206 making informational negative
activism comparatively costly. Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny have
pointed to this cost as potentially limiting arbitrage possibilities in stock
markets, inefficiently impeding share prices’ movement from reflecting
fundamental values.207 These regulations may be desirable for other reasons,
but their presence further reinforces the need to advantage informational
negative activism.
Given the potential for informational negative activism to improve
market efficiency, policymakers should at least consider efforts to reduce
the difficulties and costs associated with short selling. To the extent there
are future calls for imposing costs on short sellers, regulators should
presumptively resist such calls. Since the evidence supports subsidizing this
form of activism, not restricting it, a compelling case must be made to
overcome that presumption.
Indeed, regulators might consider implementing new rules designed to
subsidize informational negative activism. For example, long-term capital
gains taxes from short selling might be substantially reduced, perhaps to
zero. Regulators might encourage reforms related to the disparate riskiness
and cost of short selling, including reforms related to share lending.
Regulation of large institutional investors might be relaxed, to permit or
encourage these institutions to invest and engage in informational negative
activism, or at least to allocate greater resources to such activists. 208
Securities regulators might create safe harbors for short sellers, to protect
them from litigation or enforcement actions as long as they do not take
specified deleterious, manipulative actions. Our bottom-line normative
conclusion is straightforward: non-manipulative informational negative
activism should be encouraged.

204. See I.R.S. Pub. 550, supra note 177; see also supra note 178 and accompanying text.
205. Tax rules could be changed to provide a means of subsidizing negative versus positive
informational activism, but we do not consider the details of that potential change here.
206. See supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text.
207. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 49–50, 50 n.6
(1997).
208. Molk & Partnoy, supra note 44.
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2. Operational Negative Activism
Our recommendation is very different for operational negative activism.
Consider the contrasts between operational negative activism and
operational positive activism. Recall that in positive operational activism,
activists work to change a company’s operations to move asset prices in
their desired direction. Whereas positive activists act to increase the value
of companies, negative activists try to destroy it. This characteristic leads to
a sharp separation between the desirability of positive and negative
operational activism.
A case can be made that positive operational activism justifies a
regulatory subsidy. It enhances the fundamental value of companies and the
economy as a whole, as evidenced by share price returns after activist
interventions.209 While the private financial returns from positive activism
already incentivize this desirable activity, from a policy perspective these
rewards arguably are suboptimally low. Positive activists can bear
significant expenses to achieve positive change, which are not always
reimbursed,210 but they typically capture only a portion of the improvements
they generate.211 This is because the positive activist, like any investor, has
only a partial ownership stake in a targeted company; consequently, much
of the benefit they generate can be viewed as a positive externality.212 Carl
209. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (noting a 7% average abnormal share response to
positive activist interventions). As discussed above, however, not all agree that operational positive
activism improves companies over the long term. See, e.g., supra note 42; Coffee, supra note 42 (noting
the often divergent goals between activists and other shareholders).
210. For instance, activists’ costs to replace incumbent management through a proxy contest are
generally reimbursed only if the activist wins. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp.,
128 N.E.2d 291, 293 (N.Y. 1955) (formulating the typical rule that failed insurgents’ proxy contest
expenses are not reimbursable by the company); RANDALL S. THOMAS & CATHERINE T. DIXON,
ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL § 21.01 fig.21-1 (3d ed. 1998)
(reporting several insurgent proxy contest expenses that averaged approximately $1.8 million in the
1980s); Carl Icahn, Opinion, We’re Not the Boss of A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2009), https://www.nyt
imes.com/2009/03/29/opinion/29Icahn.html [https://perma.cc/7VKK-UHG2] (noting that proxy
contests at large public companies “can run into the millions of dollars”). Shareholders’ attempts to
change this reimbursement rule have been unsuccessful. See, e.g., CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension
Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (allowing board to exclude a shareholder proposal that would have
amended the company bylaws to require reimbursing any proxy contest that was successful in electing
at least one new director). Less drastic interventions than waging proxy contests, such as lobbying
existing management to change without replacing that management, can also involve financial expenses
as well as a significant investment of the activist’s time that goes uncompensated.
211. In an important recent working paper, John Coffee raises the concern that activists often settle
with firms for private benefits unavailable to other shareholders, which may mitigate these costs. Coffee,
supra note 42, at 9–15.
212. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Constraints on Private Benefits of Control:
Ex Ante Control Mechanisms Versus Ex Post Transaction Review (Columbia Law & Econ., Working
Paper No. 430, 2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129502 [https://perma.cc/
CQ84-98AR] (analyzing the analogous problem of providing compensation to controlling shareholders

https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol97/iss5/5

2020]

NEGATIVE ACTIVISM

1387

Icahn, for example, spent considerable effort lobbying Apple to change its
corporate financial structure in 2013. At the time, he owned only 0.9% of
the company’s outstanding shares, meaning 99.1% of the gains generated
by his positive activism would have accrued to other owners.213 Therefore,
unless the expected benefits to Apple as a whole were at least one hundred
times Icahn’s expected uncompensated cost in obtaining them, we would
not expect him to engage in positive activism.
Of course, the positive externalities problem is not unique to activism. In
other contexts, legal systems already manage it in various ways. Even in the
corporate sphere, the problem also arises elsewhere, such as in convincing
individual shareholders to engage in company management or exercise
control powers.214 The typical policy response to positive externalities is to
subsidize the activity.
Some current regulation already incentivizes positive operational
activism relative to other activities. As noted above, tax policy creates
incentives for activists to hold positions for more than one year, and in fact
studies show positive activist median holding periods exceed one year.215
Disclosure requirements associated with positive operational activism also
carry minimal cost.216 Moreover, private ordering solutions can encourage
activism.217
The arguments that positive operational activism is beneficial usually do
not apply to operational negative activism. Operational negative activism
typically imposes negative externalities on investors and society, harming
companies’ efficiency and profitability solely for the activist’s individual
profits. Because of these negative externalities, operational negative
activists’ incentives are not aligned with those of shareholders or the public.
who reap only a portion of their positive changes). Activists can increase the comparative magnitude of
these gains through leverage or buying call options or other similar financial derivatives. Leverage
amounts, however, are limited by Regulation T and by brokers and dealers. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R.
§ 220.12(a) (2018); see also supra notes 158–159 and accompanying text. Call options include
transaction costs and practical volume limitations that limit their usefulness. See generally 12 C.F.R.
§ 220.122(d) (noting exchange and endorsing firm margin requirements that act to limit the volume of
options that are written); Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of Options and Corporate
Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973) (developing a model to determine option prices).
213. Pat Regnier, Here’s Why Carl Icahn Wants Apple to Buy Back Shares, MONEY (Oct. 9, 2014),
http://time.com/money/3484599/icahn-letter-apple-cash/ [https://perma.cc/N724-CQD8].
214. Some have argued that this situation justifies tolerating limited private tunneling of benefits
by controlling shareholders. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 212.
215. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Returns, supra note 37, at 49.
216. As a practical matter, we also doubt whether reducing disclosure requirements would provide
much subsidy in this area. Operational activists often publicize their ideas to other shareholders to gain
traction for their suggested intervention, effectively disclosing their positions in the process. See, e.g.,
supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing Carl Icahn’s operational activism, which he
publicized despite not having an ownership stake that had to be disclosed).
217. But see CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (allowing
exclusion of shareholder proposal designed to encourage activism).

Washington University Open Scholarship

1388

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 97:1333

However, the current regulatory framework does not directly deter
operational negative activism. Moreover, other regulations that potentially
affect negative activism do not apply to operational negative activism,
raising the worry that operational negative activism is insufficiently
deterred.
Consider, for example, the alternative uptick rule, which prohibits
shorting securities whose prices have fallen by at least 10% relative to the
prior trading day’s closing price.218 This rule does little to deter operational
negative activism. The quintessential operational negative activist shorts
shares before the price begins to fall, later causing the decline through
imposing operational changes. 219 While the alternative uptick rule might
limit the activist’s ability to add to her position once the operational changes
have begun to take effect, this limitation does not impact earlier profits.
Likewise, securities antifraud provisions do little to deter many instances
of operational negative activism. Traditional insider trading restrictions
would not apply to operational negative activism, since they apply when the
activist faces a duty to disclose her informational advantage.220 This duty
typically arises when the trader breaches a confidential or fiduciary
relationship with the information’s source or the trading partner. 221
Negative activists, however, generally owe no such duty. They trade on their
own information about their operational plans, rather than information
acquired confidentially from the company;222 and they own short rather than
long positions in the company, keeping them from being treated as statutory
insiders with disclosure duties.223
Prohibitions against market manipulation also typically would not apply
to operational negative activism. Claims of market manipulation require
some type of manipulative activity, which “refers generally to practices,
such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged prices, that are intended to
mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”224 A negative
activist who spreads false information about her activities might be liable
for market manipulation, 225 but an honest negative activist who did not
218. Amendments to Regulation SHO, Exchange Act Release No. 61,595, 75 Fed. Reg. 11,232,
11,244 (Mar. 10, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 242); see also supra note 162 and accompanying
text.
219. See supra Part II.B.2.
220. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997).
221. Id.
222. See supra Part II.B.2 (examples of operational negative activism); cf. Mitts & Talley, supra
note 90, at 26–31 (analyzing whether shorting based on cybersecurity breaches could fit within existing
insider trading restrictions).
223. See supra notes 156–157 and accompanying text.
224. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977); see also Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns
& Co., 716 F.3d 18, 22 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting the manipulative act requirement for manipulation claims).
225. See, e.g., Mitts, supra note 63, at 38–41 (noting some of the difficulties that can arise in
proving market manipulation cases).
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mischaracterize any activities, or who just refused to speak, would
seemingly avoid this prohibition. Shorting alone does not constitute market
manipulation.226
Finally, although statutory insiders are directly prohibited from shorting
shares of company’s stock,227 this prohibition does little to deter operational
negative activism. To be a statutory insider, the operational negative activist
would need either to be a key executive of the company or to hold a 10%
long position in the company’s stock.228 But operational negative activists
typically have no formal employment position within a targeted
company,229 and they seek to profit from short positions, not long positions.
Given that existing restraints do little to deter operational negative
activism, and given the negative externalities that usually follow this type
of activism, we see a need for more regulation. To be sure, the burden of
bearing the costs of conducting operational negative activism will already
provide some deterrent, but situations where the negative activist’s potential
gains exceed her cost must also be dissuaded. The need for serious
regulatory prohibitions, including a meaningful threat of ex post
enforcement, is particularly warranted given the comparatively limited
ability of company management to respond, especially when (as with most
of the examples discussed in Part II.B.2) the activist can achieve her goals
without management’s involvement. Management is limited in its ability to
deter negative activism, since standard techniques that devalue the activist’s
holdings, like poison pills, don’t deter investors with short positions. 230
Companies potentially could implement negative poison pill “vitamin pills,”
which would dilute a short seller’s interest above a particular percentage
threshold upon a triggering event, but it is unclear how such devices could
be operationalized, and whether the courts would uphold them.231
226. ATSI Commc’ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 101 (2d Cir. 2007) (“In essence,
taking a short position is no different than taking a long position. To be actionable as a manipulative act,
short selling must be willfully combined with something more to create a false impression of how market
participants value a security.”).
227. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c) (2018); see also supra notes
156–157 and accompanying text.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1) (2018).
229. For example, Bill Ackman pushed for operational changes at Procter & Gamble despite
holding only a 1% ownership stake in the company and no executive position. Chris Isidore, Ackman
Wins, P&G Dumps CEO, CNNMONEY (May 24, 2013, 10:25 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/24/n
ews/companies/pg-ceo-ackman/index.html [https://perma.cc/3XKM-JBHB].
230. Memorandum from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, The Share Purchase Rights Plan (Mar.
1994), in THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 741 (Ronald J. Gilson & Bernard S.
Black eds., 2d ed. 1995) (discussing standard poison pill characteristics).
231. An effective response would need to increase the value of company stock, so that share prices
increase and reduce the value of the negative activist’s short position. Other than through financial
manipulations that may be ineffective in an efficient capital market, we presume that management is
already implementing all value-enhancing plans, as is their job. In that case, the analogue of a poison
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If operational negative activism is to be deterred but informational
negative activism is to be encouraged, the ability to categorize negative
activism grows particularly important. There are likely to be “mixed” cases
of informational and operational activism. Although operational and
informational activism are distinct categories—operational activism seeks
to impact a firm’s fundamental value, while informational seeks to impact
the public reflection of a firm’s fundamental value—the lines between the
two can blur.
For instance, consider the informational negative activist who discloses
a firm’s cyber vulnerability, which leads others to disrupt the firm’s
operations and impose negative operational changes. On one hand,
disclosure of new, accurate negative information is desirable, since it causes
securities prices to be better representations of the underlying asset’s
value.232 On the other hand, if that information obviously causes negative
operational changes that would not otherwise have occurred, the costs of
those negative changes could more than outweigh the value of the initial
information.233
It would be undesirable for the negative activist to escape consequences
of operational negative activism merely by disclosing information and then
allowing another to do the operational work. A regulatory framework would
therefore need to attribute operational changes to the informational activist
when those operational changes would naturally follow from the
information disclosure. Current activist policy fails to do so, but this
predictive link occurs in other areas of financial regulation, and we think it
could be implemented here. Regulation FD, for example, prohibits
disclosures by an issuer to holders of that issuer’s securities if it is
reasonably foreseeable that the holder would purchase or sell the issuer’s
securities based on that information.234 A similar exercise could attribute
later operational changes to an informational activist if it would be
reasonably foreseeable that revealing the information would give rise to the
negative operational changes. Then, to the extent operational negative
activism is penalized, those penalties could be applied to deter the
informational negative activist who publicly discloses information that

pill would have to make shareholders overpay for new shares at a premium to market prices, to increase
share prices. We suspect few shareholders would jump at that offer.
232. See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
233. But if the information disclosure merely hastens negative operation changes that would
happen anyway, our concerns are less, particularly if earlier implementation of those changes would
impose lower costs, such as with the breach that happens early, before more sensitive data are assembled
and lost.
234. Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. pt. 243 (2018); see also Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading,
65 Fed. Reg. 51,716 (Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 243 & 249).
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likely has negative social value.235 In turn, desirable informational activism
that is not likely to lead to negative operational changes, such as disclosing
financial fraud, would not be penalized.
In designing a rule that penalizes operational negative activism, we have
assumed that operational negative activism is harmful to society. This
assumption will not always hold, in which case penalizing operational
negative activism means we would lose out on some beneficial cases.
Sometimes operational negative activism dismantles illegitimate sources of
company value, and penalties unfortunately deter those activities. Kyle
Bass’s challenges to what were potentially illegitimate company patents, for
example, would be dissuaded under a system that penalized all operational
negative activism, 236 even though challenging invalid patents could be a
socially desirable way of policing these patents.237 But given operational
negative activism’s potential for abuse, deterring some beneficial activism
along with deterring harmful activism could be a favorable regulatory
tradeoff. Of course, if we could accurately distinguish ex ante between
socially desirable and undesirable operational negative activism, then we
should carve the good cases out from the prohibition.
3. Unintentional Negative Activism
Finally, we turn briefly to an assessment of optimal regulatory policy for
unintentional negative activism. Recall that this category of activist acquires
shares with the hope that she will improve company value but, upon
disclosing her position, share prices instead decline. Unintentional negative
activism has few redeeming qualities. 238 As with operational negative
activism, the unintentional negative activist is not expected to benefit either
the targeted company or society overall.239

235. Of course, nothing would prevent the activist from disclosing the information to the company
privately, or for the company to compensate the activist for doing so. In this scenario, the company gets
the first opportunity to address the problem without its necessarily giving rise to negative operational
changes. We view this as a desirable outcome.
236. See supra notes 73–83 and accompanying text.
237. The Patent & Trademark Office is widely believed to issue excessive bad patents, making
this form of private policing potentially important. See, e.g., Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman,
Irrational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 72 VAND. L. REV. 975, 977 (2019). But if Bass’s mixed success
is representative of operational negative activism’s potential, even his challenges might have done more
harm than good, given that the challenges were successful only approximately one-quarter of the time.
See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
238. At least the activist could say that he or she tried.
239. It is therefore important to distinguish this activist from the activist who is expected to
improve company value but unluckily proves unsuccessful down the road. We envision this latter activist
as producing a positive (or at least neutral) stock price reaction upon disclosing her position, suggesting
that market actors expect her to add value on average.
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Fortunately, private market forces may already provide an adequate
deterrent. Unintentional negative activists lose money immediately upon the
share price decline. Repeated instances will make it hard for them to raise
funds from outside investors or to engage in meaningful activism in other
companies. As with financial actors generally, market forces will punish
those positive activists with poor reputations, as evidenced by empirical
evidence linking reputation to investment inflows.240
If needed, an additional deterrent could come from courts, which could
empower management to resist unintentional negative activism by
tolerating defensive actions broadly, particularly when the announcement
of a long intervention is associated with a negative market reaction.
Delaware courts’ framework for determining the acceptability of
management’s response to a perceived threat has been developed in Unocal
v. Mesa 241 and Unitrin v. American General. 242 This framework often
requires assessing whether management’s response falls into the range of
reasonableness relative to the threat posed. 243 Although the range of
reasonableness is quite expansive, it is even broader when a company faces
more severe threats to its value.244
Because unintentional negative activism embodies exactly that type of
potential fundamental threat, the range of reasonable responses under the
Unocal and Unitrin frameworks should incorporate an assessment of the
market’s reaction to the announcement of an activist intervention. An
activist’s prior track record and stock price reactions could be useful ways
for courts to identify potential unintentional negative activism, which could
warrant a greater defensive response. In contrast, courts should view
defensive efforts more skeptically when the activism is associated with a
significant positive return upon announcement.
As a final note, consider the opposite of unintentional negative activism:
unintentional positive activism. This puzzling form of activism occurs when
the announcement by a negative activist is associated with a positive
cumulative abnormal return to the targeted company’s shares. What is the
appropriate policy response to activist behavior that profits from reduced
company value but, unintentionally, might instead improve company value?
Perhaps a negative activist’s intervention is expected to leave the company
stronger for having countered it; a company’s decisive victory might deter

240. See Krishnan, Partnoy & Thomas, supra note 13 (documenting details about funds with the
strongest reputations for clout and expertise).
241. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
242. Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995).
243. Id. at 1367, 1373.
244. Id. at 1387; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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future negative activists, for example, leaving the company more free to
pursue value.
Theoretically, this kind of attempted negative activism should be
encouraged as a policy matter when it ultimately makes the company’s
shares more valuable. But in practice, we think it will be rare. It would also
be challenging to identify this type of failed, yet desirable, negative activism
ex ante and selectively subsidize it while still deterring operational negative
activism. Accordingly, the current regulatory approach, which does not
single out this unusual phenomenon, seems appropriate.
CONCLUSION
We have introduced the concept of negative activism, provided a
typology of its three main forms, and examined empirically the extent to
which it occurs. Using this framework, we have assessed the areas in which
current regulation of negative activism is potentially inadequate. In general
terms, we favor less regulation of informational negative activism, greater
regulation of operational negative activism, and perhaps a more nuanced
approach to unintentional negative activism. Our hope is that our framework
will prove useful as the field of activist investing continues to evolve.
We conclude by observing that our analysis of negative activism has
implications for the ongoing debate about corporate short-termism. On one
side of the issue, people like Martin Lipton argue that activists contribute to
a “short-term myopic approach to management and investing that promises
to impede long-term economic prosperity.”245 For these critics, activism is
seen as generally sacrificing long-term value for (attempted) short-term
profits, such as by disrupting long-term investments, reducing activities
with uncertain distant payoffs, and focusing on quarterly profits rather than
on long-term growth.246
Others see activism as offering positive effects for long-term corporate
performance. Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, and Wei Jiang, for example, find
empirical evidence that activist interventions result in immediate positive
returns which “are followed by long-term improvements, rather than
declines, in performance.”247 Activists can improve long-term performance
245. Martin Lipton, Some Thoughts for Boards of Directors in 2018, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE (Nov. 30, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/11/30/some-thoughts-for-boardsof-directors-in-2018 [https://perma.cc/5ECZ-AHMF].
246. See, e.g., Ira M. Millstein, Re-Examining Board Priorities in an Era of Activism, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 8, 2013, 3:52 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/re-examining-board-pri
orities-in-an-era-of-activism/ [https://perma.cc/PL8P-CA4P]; K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., Hedge Fund
Activism, Firm Valuation and Stock Returns (Dec. 19, 2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?a
bstract_id=2693231 [https://perma.cc/5CEX-8J9P]. For a summary of arguments critical of activism,
see Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 11, at 1093–96.
247. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 11, at 1155.
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by providing an active check on management, reducing the agency costs
that typically exist between management and shareholders.248 To take two
common examples, reducing inefficient long-term R&D investments
improves current value and allows capital to be redeployed to better uses,
while increasing leverage imposes debt servicing costs to hold
management’s feet to the fire.249
The debate about activism’s impact on long-term value is still relatively
new. But both sides in the debate rely on data about positive activism and
often disregard negative activism. For example, in their recent study
supporting activism’s long-term effects, Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang consider
exclusively activism disclosed pursuant to section 13(d) filings,250 but these
filings capture principally long, or positive, activists, not negative
activists. 251 Critics of activism have relied on the same dataset. 252 Other
important commentators, such as Martin Lipton, also focus primarily on
positive activism, not negative activism.253 In other words, the debate to date
largely revolves around studying only one subset of activism.254
Negative activism adds a new wrinkle to the short-termism debate.
Consider arguments by critics of positive activism that there is a disconnect
between short-term market reaction and long-term value, with short-term
price increases followed by long-term declines. Does this mean short selling
will be long-term value enhancing to the extent it causes short-term price
declines? Or consider arguments by proponents of positive activism that
short-term increases reflect expected increases in future corporate earnings.
Does it follow that short selling is long-term value destroying? More
generally, how should scholars interpret the distribution of short-term price
responses to the announcement of negative activism? How should one
measure the potential benefits associated with negative activism that
potentially might outweigh the decline in the value of the targeted
248. While management’s duty is to act in the company’s interest, that duty is not always
diligently pursued. See, e.g., supra note 40 and accompanying text; Robert J. Rhee, A Legal Theory of
Shareholder Primacy, 102 MINN. L. REV. 1951 (2018).
249. See Brav, Jiang, Partnoy & Thomas, Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 37; Coffee & Palia,
The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism, supra note 42, at 64–65.
250. Bebchuk, Brav & Jiang, Long-Term Effects, supra note 11, at 1098–1101. Bebchuk, Brav &
Jiang discuss their sample of activism in a section titled “The Universe of Hedge Fund Activism.” Id.
251. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 13(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (2018); see supra notes 132–
141 and accompanying texts (discussing the scope of section 13(d) requirements).
252. See, e.g., Cremers et al., supra note 246, at 2.
253. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 41 (“[V]oting power is being harnessed by a gaggle of activist
hedge funds who troll through SEC filings looking for opportunities to demand a change in a company’s
strategy or portfolio that will create a short-term profit without regard to the impact on the company’s
long-term prospects.”).
254. As noted above, there are some recent exceptions to the focus on positive activism, including
a few new and important articles that have focused on certain aspects of negative activism. See, e.g.,
Appel & Fos, supra note 66; Mitts, supra note 63. We find these recent efforts encouraging, and applaud
them.
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company’s shares? In other areas of law, such as free speech jurisprudence,
instances of individual harm are tolerated in furtherance of a more general
principle. Might negative activism be yet another example? We look
forward to a robust debate on these and other issues related to negative
activism.
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